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INTRODUCTION

Private international law, the system of rules used by courts to
resolve conflict of laws in the international context,' is based on
principles of territorial sovereignty and equality among sovereigns. It
assumes that each state has the authority to regulate persons and
activities within its borders, and that the laws and actions of one state
can have no direct effect in another. Private international law rules
applicable in the particular context of regulatory law reflect this
orientation, positioning conflict of economic laws as a matter of
1. In using the term "system of rules," I do not intend to indicate uniformity: conflicts law in
the United States is anything but uniform. For an overview of the diverse approaches used by
U.S. courts, see, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000: As

the Century Turns, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2001). The competing theories of conflicts law do,
however, share this theoretical foundation.
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relations among sovereign states.2 Those rules operate, however, within
the larger framework of economic regulation in the international arena.
There, the increase in transnational business activity has generated
various legal initiatives that specifically contemplate incursions into
state sovereignty as traditionally understood.3 Ranging from measures
aimed at developing transnational law to measures intended to facilitate
the coordination and application of bodies of national law in the crossborder context, these proposals in practical terms contemplate a
diminution of the absolute power of a state to subject relationships
within its borders to its own positive law.
The globalization of economic markets, and attendant changes in
cross-border regulatory strategies, therefore challenge the foundational
principles of private international law. In part, these developments
simply present with particular immediacy a familiar problem: how to
regulate cross-border business activity in a system that defines
regulatory sovereignty as a territorial prerogative.4 They do more,
however. By challenging the conception of regulatory power as
grounded in the territorial authority of sovereign states, and by
reshaping the process of international economic regulation and the role
of national law in that process, these developments have directly
affected private international law itself. They have caused a shift within
conflicts jurisprudence from traditional, sovereignty-based models of
conflict resolution to a substantivist model.
In a traditional model of conflicts analysis, based on territorial
sovereignty, the primary means of protecting domestic regulatory
interests in a situation of conflict is the application of domestic law. In
other words, a state concerned in a conflict of economic laws will seek
to effectuate its regulatory interests by applying its own law to the
dispute.6 On a substantivist view, however, economic policy interests
may be protected simply through assurance that the substance of
2. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES (American Law Institute 1987) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT] § 415
(Jurisdiction to Regulate Anti-Competitive Activities), § 416 (Jurisdiction to Regulate Activities
Related to Securities).
3. See JARROD WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE' HARMONIZATION OF LAW 8 (1999)

(defining the power "to exercise supreme authority over a territory carved on the physical map of
the world" as a primary aspect of sovereignty).
4. See FRIEDRICH JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE

21

(1993)

[hereinafter MULTISTATE JUSTICE] (noting the impossibility of reconciling "the territorial limits

of sovereignty and the free flow of multistate transactions.").
5. See infra Part IV.
6. Alternatively, if one state's laws do not prohibit the conduct in question, that state might
seek to assert its regulatory power by blocking the application of another state's law.
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applicable law-whether the law of a foreign country, lex mercatoria,
or supranational law-is sufficiently similar to that of the concerned
state. Such a system has one important, advantage: because it does not
cast conflicts of economic laws as competitions for regulatory authority
among sovereigns, it reduces the potential for friction in the area of
foreign relations. 7 This Article suggests, however, that the shift in U.S.
conflicts law from sovereignty to substantivism is problematic.
Analyzing the interaction between the private international law rules
applicable to economic activity and the larger regulatory environment
within which those rules operate, it identifies two disadvantages of a
substantivist approach: first, the potential for over-application of U.S.
law in international contract cases; and second, the danger that the
negotiating process by which substantivist solutions are created will
lead to procedural unfairness in the resolution of economic conflicts.
Part II of this Article examines the foundation of territorial
sovereignty on which solutions to conflict of economic laws have
traditionally been built, tracing its influence in two areas of the conflict
of laws. Part III turns to the regulatory context in which conflicts rules
operate. Analyzing regulatory trends in the areas of securities, antitrust,
and bankruptcy law, it discusses the globalization of economic activity
and the waning importance of territorial sovereignty in the development
of cross-border regulatory strategies. Part IV then analyzes the shift
from sovereignty to substantivism, examining the mechanisms by which
U.S. economic policy is protected under each approach. Finally, Part V
assesses the cost of a focus on substantivism. It criticizes the increased
emphasis on substantive similarity of economic laws, identifying two
particular disadvantages of a purely substantive system. The Article

concludes by suggesting that territorial factors be re-integrated into this
new system.
II.

TERRITORY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

LAW
A.

Forms of Conflict ofInternationalEconomic Laws
This Article addresses two different types of conflict of economic

laws. The first, relevant in the setting of international contract litigation,
7. The history of blocking statutes, adopted in some countries in response to perceived overaggressiveness by others in applying their antitrust law, illustrates the potential consequences of
such friction. The application of such statutes is discussed in the FOREIGN RELATIONS
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 442, Reporters' Note 4.
8. See infra Part V.
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is resolved through direct application of traditional choice-of-law rules.
The second, relevant in cases addressing the extraterritorial application
of U.S. regulatory laws, does not raise choice-of-law questions in the
strict sense of that term; nevertheless, traditional choice-of-law
jurisprudence is often used to analyze the extraterritorial reach of
regulatory laws. While the principles used to resolve conflicts in these
categories therefore coincide, in certain situations the procedural
context of a conflict has an impact on its resolution.9 It is therefore
worth pausing to clarify the distinctions between these forms of conflict.
International contract litigation often raises the question whether the
parties' choice of a foreign forum (whether judicial or arbitral) or
foreign law may operate to exclude application of U.S. regulatory
statutes. For example, in a dispute between a U.S. distributor and a
foreign manufacturer arising out of a distribution agreement, a court
might consider whether a forum-selection clause or a foreign governinglaw clause in that contract should be enforced, preventing the distributor
from raising a claim, or counter-claim, under U.S. antitrust law.'"
Similarly, in a dispute between a U.S. investor and a foreign issuer
arising out of an investment contract, a court might consider whether
choice clauses should be enforced whose application would preclude a
claim under U.S. securities laws." The enforceability of forum-selection
and governing-law clauses is an issue falling within the scope of
conflict of laws, 2 and the conflicts that arise in such litigation are in that
sense "regular" choice-of-law conflicts. 3
A different form of regulatory conflict involves not choice of law, but
rather the question of legislative jurisdiction. 4 In this context, conflicts
arise when one sovereign seeks to apply its economic laws to conduct
that occurs in another state, or when more than one sovereign seeks to
regulate the same activity. For example, a court may be called upon to

9. See infra Part V.A infra, discussing different stages of analysis in the Lloyd's cases.
10. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d. Cir. 1993).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (American Law

Institute 1971) [hereinafter CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT] § 80 (forum selection), § 187 (choice of
governing law). Note, by comparison, that the type of conflict raised by questions of
extraterritoriality is considered in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. See FOREIGN
RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 403.
13. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney Generalin a Global Age: Public Interests
in Private InternationalAntitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 225-26 (2001) for a

discussion of this form of traditional conflicts analysis.
14. Also known as prescriptive jurisdiction. See FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra
note 2, § 401 (classifying the categories of jurisdiction as jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to

adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce).
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determine whether U.S. securities laws apply to a sale of securities to a
U.S. purchaser when the sale itself occurs in a foreign jurisdiction,"5 or
whether U.S. antitrust laws apply to anti-competitive conduct that
occurs abroad. 6 In considering a claim that particular cross-border
conduct violates U.S. regulatory law, a court does not choose between
forum regulatory law and foreign regulatory law; rather, it chooses
either to apply forum regulatory law or to dismiss the claim. 7 In such
cases, then, the issue is simply defining the scope of U.S. regulatory
law-that is, determining whether the relevant U.S. statute reaches the
conduct in question. Principles borrowed from traditional choice-of-law
analysis are often used to assist that inquiry, however. 8 Similarly, crossborder insolvency proceedings 9 raise issues resolved by recourse to
traditional choice-of-law analysis. For instance, a U.S. bankruptcy court
may be asked to decide whether to distribute assets located within the
United States to U.S. creditors-under U.S. bankruptcy law-or to
remit those assets for distribution in a foreign proceeding, in which
foreign bankruptcy law would apply.2" In making that decision, it will
apply choice-of-law principles.2'
Although these forms of conflict differ, extraterritoriality
jurisprudence shares with choice-of-law jurisprudence a theoretical
foundation in notions of territorial sovereignty.
B.

Territory and Sovereign Power

Traditional private international law theory is situated within a
framework of allocation of power, where the fundamental inquiry is
how to locate the sovereign whose claim to regulate particular activity is
superior to competing claims by other sovereigns.22 Such claims to
15. See, e.g., Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147
F. 3d 118 (2nd. Cir. 1998).

16. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th. Cir. 1976).
17. Donald T. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the InternationalReach
of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 617 (1961); see also Philip J.
McConnaughay, Reviving the "PublicLaw Taboo" in InternationalConflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J.

INT'L L. 255, 262 (1999) (tracing this principle to "the centuries old refusal of nations to enforce
the penal or revenue laws of other nations").
18. See discussion infra at notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
19. That is, insolvencies involving creditors and/or assets in more than one country.

20. See, e.g., In re Lines, 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
21. See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking InternationalInsolvency: The Neglected
Role of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 23 (2000) (describing the role of

choice-of-law analysis in the resolution of cross-border bankruptcies).
22. For a recent discussion of this framework in the context of economic law, see Joel
Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 33, 40
(1996) (describing the central issue within private international law as determining which state
will be allocated the legal power to regulate a certain transaction).
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regulate have in turn depended largely on the territorial aspect of
sovereignty: the absolute right of a sovereign to regulate economic
affairs within its borders. 23 The general maxims of conflicts law set
forth by Justice Story, regarded as the father of private international law
theory in the United States, reflect this premise. His influential treatise
on private international law sets forth these basic propositions: First,
that "every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction
within its own territory;" second, that "[h]e, or those, who have the
sovereign authority, have the sole right to make laws;" and,
consequently, that "whatever force or obligation the laws of one country
have in another, depends solely on the laws, and municipal regulations
of the latter ...and upon its own express or tacit consent." 24
The orientation of this model around territorial authority to regulate
has shaped traditional approaches toward international conflicts.25
Techniques for resolving conflicts of economic law of both
kinds-conflicts between forum law and law chosen by contracting
parties and conflicts created by
overlapping regulatory
jurisdiction-have historically been grounded in notions of sovereign
authority. The following section discusses those techniques and the
emphasis on territory they create.

23.

While the concept of sovereignty is of course multi-faceted, it is this territorial aspect that

grounds private international law analysis. For further discussion of territorial sovereignty, see
Wiener, supra note 3; see also Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History,
48 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 353, 356-57 (1995) ("A final necessary ingredient is territoriality.

Sovereignty is authority within a discrete land, bounded by borders.... Sovereignty is supreme
legitimate authority within a territory.") (emphasis in original).
24. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19-21, 24 (1834) (Arno

Press ed. 1972).
25. See Robert W. Hillman, Cross-Border Investment, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 331, 336

(1992) (noting that the phrase "jurisdiction to prescribe" suggests the "[parceling out of] lawmaking competence to territorial units called states").
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Conflicts in InternationalContract Cases: Limits of Party
Autonomy

As described above, one form of conflict arises when a court is asked
to enforce a forum-selection or governing-law clause contained in an
international contract, and thereby to preclude application of forum law
to the conduct in question. Historically, conflicts created by the parties'
choice of a competing forum or law were resolved by reference to the
exclusive authority of the sovereign to regulate within its territory. To
put it another way, attempts by private actors to affect applicable law
were hardly viewed as creating conflict at all. Forum-selection clauses
were deemed invalid as 'attempts to oust the forum court of its
jurisdiction," and choice-of-law clauses were deemed invalid as
inconsistent with the absolute right of a sovereign to apply its law to
persons and conduct within its territory." With respect to governing-law
clauses, this absolutist approach was succeeded relatively early by a
more flexible jurisprudence that recognized the right of private parties
to choose the law governing certain activity.28 Later, the ability of
parties to choose the forum in which eventual litigation would be heard
was recognized as well.29
Even in this more permissive environment, however, courts
continued to impose additional limits on the exercise of party autonomy,
reflecting the continued importance of sovereign authority, when
transnational contracts implicated the regulatory laws of one or more
countries." Thus, if in the course of contract litigation a claim or
26. See Carbon Black Export v. SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1958) (describing

this as a "universally accepted rule").
27. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the

Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 571, 589 fn. 75 (1999) (describing the basis of
this approach in "abstract notions of the law as an expression of state sovereignty which cannot
possibly be subject to the choice of private parties").
28. CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 187. See also Reimann, supra note 27, at
575, tracing this development, at least in the courts, to the nineteenth century.
29. CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 80, providing that a forum-selection
agreement "will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." See generally Patrick J.
Borchers, The Internationalizationof Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
421, 431-32 (1995).

30. Even outside the regulatory context, certain territorial aspects were still evident in the
U.S. approach. With regard to choice of law, although it is expressed differently in various legal
standards, a requirement that the chosen law have some connection with the transaction or
activity in question is common. See Uniform Commercial Code § 1-105(1), and Official

Comment I thereto ("Ordinarily the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant
enough portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs."); see
generally Borchers, supra note 29, at 434. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts includes a

"substantial relationship" test, but goes on to provide that the choice of a governing law on some
other "reasonable basis" is also acceptable. CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §
187(2)(a).
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counterclaim was asserted under U.S. regulatory law, that law would be
applied without regard fo the substantive law of contract chosen by the
parties or otherwise applicable under choice-of-law analysis. 3 This was
true both when the regulatory law irn question contained an explicit antiwaiver clause (for example, securities law)3 2 and when it did not (for
example, antitrust law). Although the theoretical basis for this limitation
on party autonomy was not uniformly articulated,33 it was uniformly
accepted that the right of the sovereign to shape domestic policy within
its territory simply trumped party autonomy. In this sense, choice-oflaw issues in contracts implicating economic regulation were dealt with
through recourse to sovereign prerogative.34 Thus, although party
autonomy in general has for quite some time been interpreted
expansively and with little emphasis on territory, conflicts of economic
laws in particular were until very recently viewed through the lens of
sovereign power.
2.

Conflicts ofLegislative Jurisdiction

a.

The role of territory in establishing bases of legislative
jurisdiction

Just as territorial sovereignty defined the limits of party autonomy in
international contracts, it also defined the scope of a state's jurisdiction
to regulate economic activity. The importance of territorial boundaries
in resolving conflicts of legislative jurisdiction is particularly clear in
early cases holding that U.S. regulatory statutes reached only conduct
occurring within the borders of the United States. 5 Although later cases
31. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).

32. See Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: "[a]ny..
'
.provision binding any
person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter... shall be void." 15 U.S.C. §

78cc(a). The Securities Act of 1933 contains a similar provision. 15 U.S.C. § 77n.
33. As this limitation is considered part of the "public law taboo," one explanation offered is
that parties may choose only private but not public laws. Regulatory laws do not fit
neatly into
traditional categories of public vs. private, however, as they govern private relationships but also
establish the public economic framework. See Amir N. Licht, InternationalDiversity in Securities
Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 255-57 and 261-

63 (1998) for a discussion of the public/private distinction in the area of securities regulation.
Similarly, the suggestion that the limitation derives from regulatory law's status as "mandatory

law" is less useful in a common-law regime than in civil-law jurisdictions familiar with this
distinction. See McConnaughay, supra note 17 (who also argues for a distinction between
"mandatory public law" and "nonmandatory public law.").
34. As discussed infra.at Part IV.B. I.,this orientation has recently, changed in the United

States.
35. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (considering the reach of
U.S. antitrust law); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). See also Stephen J. Choi &
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held that U.S. law also applied to certain conduct occurring outside U.S.

borders,36 those cases based jurisdiction to presciibe on the existence of
effects within the United States; in that sense, they too remain rooted in
considerations of territory.37 The primary bases for U.S. assertion of
regulatory authority therefore derive from the sovereign's power to
control the economic landscape within its borders.3"

b.

The role of territory in limiting legislative jurisdiction

The tremendous increase in cross-border business activity created an
increase in the incidence of overlapping regulatory jurisdiction. Issuers
engage in securities offerings outside their home jurisdictions;39
corporations with substantial activities in multiple countries merge with
others;4" multinational corporations with assets, debtors and creditors in

multiple countries file for bankruptcy4 iin each such case, more than
one state may assert prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of conduct
within its territory. Moreover, as U.S. courts and courts in other
jurisdictions began to apply regulatory law to extraterritorial conduct,
additional regulatory overlaps were created as countries obtained

jurisdiction based on different jurisdictional tests. One state's law might
apply to conduct because it occurred within its borders, for instance,
Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J.

INT'L L. & BuS. 207, 216 (1996) (describing this process as "partition[ing] the world neatly into
mutually exclusive legal regimes.").
36. Thus overcoming the "presumption against extraterritoriality."
37. The Comments to § 402 of the Foreign Relations Restatement note that "Jurisdiction
[based on effects within the United States] is an aspect of jurisdiction based on territoriality."
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 402 cmt. d. See also Buxbaum, supra
note 13, for a discussion of these cases and of the different levels of effect necessary to establish
jurisdiction in the antitrust area; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1968) for the
development of these tests in the securities context. Similar developments also occurred in other
jurisdictions. In the Wood Pulp case, a test analogous to the effects test-although framed in
terms of "implementing conduct"--was adopted in the European Union. A. Ahlstrim Osakeyhti6
v. Commission of the European Communities, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (In re Wood Pulp).
38. Section 402 of the Foreign Relations Restatement, in setting forth the bases of jurisdiction
to prescribe, reflects this emphasis on territory:
(1)
(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory.
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 402(i). Although nationality is also an
acceptable basis of jurisdiction, "territoriality is considered the normal" and "by far the most
common basis" for the exercise of jurisdiction. Id, § 402 cmts a. and b.
39. Consider, for example, a global securities offering conducted in several regions
simultaneously by a multinational corporation.
40. Consider, for example, the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas or GE/Honeywell transactions.
41. Consider, for example, the failure of the Maxwell empire.
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while another's might apply because of effects caused within its borders
by that conduct.42 Many courts therefore looked beyond the initial
establishment of a jurisdictional basis to regulate for a means of
resolving these conflicts of regulatory jurisdiction.43 The primary
method applied to this end-interest balancing-nevertheless retained a
focus on territorial power.

The interest-balancing approach maintains that conflicts of legislative
jurisdiction must be resolved in order to preserve harmonious relations
among states.' The method of resolving them is to fold a consideration

of competing jurisdictional claims into the analysis of statutory scope:
despite the existence of a jurisdictional basis as outlined above, the
regulatory interests of another country may be held sufficient to
preclude application of U.S. law to the conduct.4" The analysis therefore

remains anchored in territorial considerations, as the conflict is framed
as a possible infringement on the sovereignty of another state, and is
resolved by determining which sovereign's authority to regulate is
superior.46
The origin of the interest balancing analysis in multilateralism, 47
a
choice-of-law theory, reinforces this territorial orientation.
42. Or one state's law might apply because of the nationality of the actors: cf Laker Airways
Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (deciding a conflict created when one sovereign
asserted prescriptive jurisdiction based on the nationality principle, and the other on the basis of
effects).
43. Not all courts did so. Some adopted a unilateralist view, on which the analysis begins and
ends with the establishment of a jurisdictional basis to regulate. See, e.g., id. at 953 (declining to
limit U.S. jurisdiction in a case of concurrent jurisdiction); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,
480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (declining to balance U.S. and U.K. interests).
Proponents of this view believe conflicts of regulatory authority to be inevitable and not
amenable to resolution by the judiciary. For a defense of this approach, see generally William S.
Dodge, Extraterritorialityand Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,
39 HARV. INT'LL.J. 101 (1998).
44. See Trautman, supra note 17, at 616 ("[Tlhe fact that another country also asserts
jurisdiction cannot be disregarded.").
45. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1188
n.63 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (characterizing the consideration of competing regulatory interests as "part
of the jurisdictional determination"); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritorialityand Conflicts of
Jurisdiction, 77 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 370, 376 (1983). Occasionally, however, courts have
considered the question instead as a matter of judicial abstention. See, e.g., Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
46. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d. Cir. 1975) ("When ... a
court is confronted with transactions that on any view are predominantly foreign, it must seek to
determine whether Congress would have wished [to] ... leave the problem to foreign
countries.").
47. Whether it is appropriate to use a method developed in the area of private law to address
questions of the scope of public regulatory law is a question that has generated much debate.
Compare Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict of Laws,
InternationalLaw, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURs 311,
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Multilateralism, an approach used to choose which law governs a
particular private-law dispute, examines the connections between the

relevant legal relationship and one or more fora in order to find the
proper "seat" of that relationship.4" It therefore depends largely on an
examination of points of contact between the parties and their activity
and particular geographic locations.4 9 Adapted by analogy in the

regulatory context in the form of interest balancing,"0 this approach
considers whether "the interests of, and links to, the United States" are
strong enough-compared to those of other countries-to support
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.5 ' This analysis necessarily
involves an examination of geographic connections52 and therefore
retains the territorial orientation of multilateralism."
III.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE RECEDING STATE

The forces of economic globalization 4 challenge fundamentally the
traditional allocation of regulatory power among sovereign states. Both
350 (1979) with Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionat a Crossroads:An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982). See also Jlrgen
Basedow, Conflicts of Economic Regulation, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 423 (1994) (discussing the
"gray area" between policy and conflicts rules).
48. MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 10-27 (discussing Savigny).
49. Id. For example, a court might consider in which state a contract had been executed, in
which it was to be performed, in which the parties thereto resided, and so forth.
50. As discussed above, the technique is adopted by analogy rather than directly simply
because in the regulatory context the court is not choosing a law but defining the scope of
domestic statutes.
51. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). See also
Lowenfeld, supra note 47, at 350 (looking for the place of the most significant relationship.)
52. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law provides in part that:
Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined
by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a)
the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b)
the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity
to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 403(2).
53. See Trachtman, supra note 22, at 40 (describing the central issue within private
international law as determining which state will be allocated the legal power to regulate a certain
transaction).
54. "Globalization" itself means different things to different people. See generally GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 2-10 (David Held et al. eds., 1999)
(sketching out competing theories of globalization). I discuss here the changes underpinning the
processes of globalization, such as the developments in technology and regulatory policy that
have led to increased connectedness and integration of markets and economic activity.
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the increased multiplicity of jurisdictional contacts of typical business
activity and the (arguably) non-jurisdictional nature of cyberspace and

e-commerce55 have profoundly disturbed a predominant aspect of what
is traditionally understood as sovereignty: exclusivity of authority over
events occurring within a state's borders.56 Globalization is for this
reason seen by some as the agent of sovereignty's demise; to those
who see a continuing role for the nation-state, it has been the agent for a
redistribution of regulatory authority that seeks to respond to the waning
importance of geographic territory.58
Across many areas of government, regulatory power traditionally
enjoyed by sovereign states has shifted to other levels.59 Some has
shifted to the supranational level, as states have acceded to treaties and

other instruments designed to address transnational activity;6' some has
been ceded to private actors; 61 and some has been transferred to
informal networks constituted among sub state-level agencies in

different countries.62 Such redistributions of authority are prevalent in
the area of transnational commercial activity in particular. On the
55. Activity in cyberspace in particular raises the issue of deterritorialization, but commercial
activity in general seems increasingly borderless as well. See Joel P. Trachtman, Cyberspace,
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction,and Modernism, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 561 (1998). See also
the discussion of offshore financial markets as another kind of deterritorialized activity in SASKIA
SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION xii (1996).
56. See note 23 supra; see also Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and
Globalization, andHuman Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) ("In simpler days,
state sovereignty implied several key elements. Primarily, it meant political independence. It also
meant territorial integrity and virtually exclusive control and jurisdiction within that territory.")
57. See, e.g., KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (1995); GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 54, at 3-5 (discussing the diminished role of states on this view).
58. See Trachtman, supra note 55, at 562 ("It is not the state that has died, but the longmoribund theory of absolute territorial sovereignty."). See also GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS,
supra note 54, at 7-9 for a description of this view: "While not disputing that states still retain the
ultimate legal claim to 'effective supremacy over what occurs within their own territories,' the
transformationalists argue that this is juxtaposed, to varying degrees, with the expanding
jurisdiction of institutions of international governance and the constraints of, as well as the
obligations derived from, international law." Id. at 8. See also Henkin, supra note 56, at 6: "So we
have the phenomenon of globalization and everybody thinks it is doing something to sovereignty
(I think it is, too, although I'm not sure exactly what)."
59. See generally Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997.
60. Id. at 58-60; see also Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law-Legitimacy,
Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555,
1556-61 (1999).
61. See Trachtman, supra note 55, at 580 ("States continue to facilitate.., private ordering
by enforcing choice of law and forum clauses in private contracts.").
62. See David Zaring, International Law By Other Means: The Twilight Existence of
InternationalFinancialRegulatory Organizations,33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281 (1998); Sol Picciotto,
Networks in InternationalEconomic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of NeoLiberalism, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014 (1996-97).
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supranational level, for example, multinational conventions have been
ratified addressing the international sale of goods63 and the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards.' With respect to non-national
solutions to the problems presented by business activity in the global
age, the call for a new lex mercatoria has gained strength.65 On the substate level, the work of state agencies in developing regulatory
frameworks fluid enough to meet the challenges posed by the increased
mobility of labor and capital has become increasingly important. While
none of these changes necessarily heralds the end of state-centered
economic regulation, they do reflect shifts in the way the allocation of
regulatory authority is conceptualized.66 Not surprisingly, these
developments have important consequences for models of conflict of
regulatory laws as well.
This Part examines three major developments in the regulation of
international economic activity: (1) the increased power of private
actors, as well as supranational organizations and non-governmental
organizations, in economic regulation; (2) the movement in favor of
harmonizing laws applicable to international transactions; and (3) the
trend toward regulatory cooperation and coordination among states and
state agencies. Looking at various points at bankruptcy, antitrust and
securities law, it analyzes ways in which these developments have deemphasized the role of sovereign authority in resolving conflicts of
economic laws.
A.

More Regulatory Choices Made at Non-sovereign Level

1.

The Role of PrivateActors

The goal of achieving predictability and certainty in international
commerce has historically been viewed as a private-law value relevant
more to individuals than to states.67 In recent decades, however, it has
assumed more significance as a regulatory goal in and of itself. One
expression of this development is in the rise in arbitration, through
63. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1489
U.N.T.S. 3 (1980).
64. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1958).
65. See Kazuaki Sono, The Rise of Anational Contract Law in the Age of Globalization, 75
TUL. L. REv. 1185 (2001); Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New

Law Merchant, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487 (1995). The work of the International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is also relevant to these developments.
66. See Trachtman's comparison of "conclusory" vs. "contingent" sovereignty. Trachtman,
supranote 55, at 564.
67. See Harold Maier, supra note 47.
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which the dispute resolution mechanism for use in cross-border business
transactions has been largely privatized and international commercial
transactions "effectively denationalize[d]. '""8 Much more recently, some
commentators have gone further, proposing a more systematic
expansion of autonomy principles as a means of addressing the
challenges of regulation in the international arena. Professors Choi and
Guzman, for instance, have suggested a system under which companies
would be free to select the securities regime of any country (not only the
country in which their securities were sold or traded) to govern their
securities dealings.69 Similarly, Professor Rasmussen has proposed a
bankruptcy system under which companies would choose, from a menu
of insolvency options, the bankruptcy regime that would apply in the
event of their insolvency.7"
These proposals mark a significant shift away from traditional
conceptions of prescriptive jurisdiction: indeed, they effectively
decouple the links between territory and regulatory authority. Under
Choi and Guzman's proposal, the law of one country might apply to a
sale of securities that took place entirely in another country and did not
involve the chosen country's nationals; similarly, under Rasmussen's, a
country's bankruptcy regime might apply to the insolvency of a
company with neither assets nor creditors within that country's borders.
In fact, Professor Rasmussen's proposal goes even further: his ideal
menu of insolvency options consists of a single unified set of options
rather than a series of options each of which was proposed by a
sovereign state.7 Thus, the chosen law might not even have a sovereign
source. While these proposals take private choice further than legislators
are likely to go, they reflect the trend in favor of private solutions to
conflicts of economic regulation.

68. Friedrich K. Juenger, The Needfor a Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law Problems,
73 TUL. L. REV. 1309, 1329 (1999) (noting also that "[t]his preferred method of dispute
resolution allows parties to frustrate the governmental interests that supposedly control multistate

transactions.").
69. They term this system "portable reciprocity." See Choi & Guzman, supra note 35, at 23133; Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, PortableReciprocity: Rethinking the International

Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S.CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998). For other private choice
arguments in the securities context, see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward
Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (1999).
70. Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1997).
71. Id.at 26 n.120.
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Growing Role of SupranationalOrganizationsand NGOs

While some regulatory authority has devolved on private actors,
some has also shifted to supranational organizations and to nongovernmental organizations. This development is evident when one
considers the role such actors have played in efforts to harmonize or
coordinate regulatory laws.72 In bankruptcy, for example, early efforts
focused on treaties or conventions negotiated at the state level, such as
the draft treaty between the United States and Canada73 and the Council
of Europe's draft multilateral Convention.74 In recent years, however,
the larger share of reform efforts has been carried out primarily by
supranationals or NGOs. A Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat was
drafted under the auspices of the International Bar Association,75 as,
earlier, was the Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act;76 the
American Law Institute recently completed its North American
Transnational Insolvency Project;77 and the United Nations Committee
on International and Trade-Related Law (UNCITRAL), a supranational
organization, was responsible for drafting the Model Law now being
considered by member nations.78 Additionally, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank have played an important role in
the convergence of bankruptcy law by requiring bankruptcy reform in
developing countries as a condition of loan support.79
In other fields as well, international efforts have involved such
organizations. In securities law, not only coalitions of regulatory
72. Of course, much work has also been done by arms of the sovereign state, such as the
regulatory agencies. See infra Part III.C. for a discussion of various cooperative efforts.
73. See generally Kurt H. Nadelmann, InternationalBankruptcy Law: Its Present Status, 5 U.
TORONTO L. J. 324 (1944).
74.- Council of Europe Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy (the
"Istanbul Convention").
75. See generally Anne Nielsen, Mike Sigal & Karen Wagner, The Cross-BorderInsolvency
Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of InternationalInsolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR.
L. J. 533 (1996) (setting forth and discussing the text of the Concordat).
76. See generally Timothy E. Powers, The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act:
A Twenty-First Century Proposal for International Insolvency Co-operation, in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 687
(Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994).
. 77. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Transnational Insolvency Project ofthe American Law
Institute, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 99 (2001) (outlining the principles of cooperation approved as a
result); Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law Institute NAFTA
Insolvency Project, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7 (1997).
78. U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Annex I, at 68-78, U.N. Doc. A/52/17 (1997), reprinted in Andre
J. Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
309, 401 (1998). The Model Law has been incorporated in the Bankruptcy Reform Act currently
awaiting conference in Congress. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. (2001).
79. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Colloquy: A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2278 (2000) for a discussion of the role of these agencies in reform.
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commissions 0 but also non-governmental groups have been
instrumental in reform efforts. The International Accounting Standards
Committee, a private organization, was responsible for much of the
work in the development of international accounting standards for use in
cross-border offerings.8' In antitrust, similarly, the Competition Law and
Policy Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development has played a role in the development of international
antitrust policy.' In addition, the World Trade Organization has
proposed a pre-merger notification system for use in cross-border
transactions. 3
International, regional and non-governmental organizations-rather
than treaty negotiations between sovereigns-have thus played an
increasingly important role in the development of law applicable to
transnational activity.' This development too reflects a move away
from a territorial sovereignty-based view of economic conflict, as nonstate entities are less concerned with protecting regulatory turf in a
territorial sense than agencies or other state actors. This is not to say that
such entities don't further certain interests, some of which may coincide
with the interests of particular sovereign states-but the context in
which they operate shifts the regulatory focus away from sovereign
authority within particular borders.
B.

HarmonizationMovement

Broadly speaking, one might identify two general trends in the
movement described generally as harmonization of international
economic law. The first is convergence or unification, which would
favor the development of uniform regulatory law worldwide.85 This
80. Much work has been done through the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO). See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global
Securities Offerings: Analysis of JurisdictionalApproaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20
MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 238-46 (1999).

81. The IASC is a private entity, formed in 1973 by accounting entities from the United
States and other. countries. For a thorough description of the IASC and its mission, see Licht,
supra note 33, at 231-32.
82. See Department of Justice, The 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelinesfor International
Operations: An Introduction, available at 1995 WL 150745 at *5 (1995) [hereinafter Antitrust

Enforcement Guidelines] (stating that "regular meetings of the CLP [Competition Law and Policy
Committee] have fostered a natural convergence of substantive antitrust policy").
83. See generally Andre Fiebig, A Rolefor the WTO in InternationalMerger Control, 20 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 233 (2000).
84. See generally Loukas A. Mistelis, Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization,
Legal Transplants, and Law Reform-Some Fundamental Observations, 34 INT'L LAW. 1055

(2000).
85. Or at least in particular geographic regions.
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strand of harmonization contemplates perhaps the most fundamental
disturbance of the role of sovereignty in economic regulation, in that it
would replace entirely the domestic laws of individual sovereign
states. 6 The second strand is the development of harmonized rules for
use in cross-border cases. Although such systems would not replace
domestic law for use in domestic cases, they would nevertheless
constitute a move away from sovereignty-based conflicts analysis in
that they would obviate the need to select one sovereign's law over
another's for application in cross-border cases."
While wholesale unification of economic law remains a very distant
possibility, 8 substantial steps toward convergence have been taken in
discrete areas. In the securities area, for example, insider-trading laws
patterned after (though weaker than) U.S. regulations have been adopted
in a large number of countries. 9 Anti-competition laws, too, have
become more widespread.9" As the literature in this area reflects, a
continued emphasis on this form of harmonization can be expected.9 1
Harmonization in the second sense-the adoption of harmonized
86. Or at least the laws of certain sovereign states: if convergence took the form of
Americanization, for instance, then U.S. domestic law would not change appreciably. Generally,
however, the fact that unification would require the wholesale replacement of existing national
laws is identified by some commentators as presenting an insurmountable obstacle to the process
of this form of harmonization. See Paul Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization
in InternationalCommercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743 (1999).
87. See Mathias Reimann, Comparative Law for the InternationalAge, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1103,

1108) (2001) (describing the effect of harmonization and cooperation as a "curtailment of
sovereignty.").
88. See generallyJllrgen Basedow, InternationalAntitrust: From ExtraterritorialApplication

to Harmonization, 60 LA. L. REv. 1037 (2000) (discussing the prospects for unification in
antitrust); Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of InternationalBankruptcy Law and Practice: Is It
Necessary? Is It Possible?, 27 INT'L LAW. 881 (1993) (bankruptcy); Robert W. Hillman, CrossBorder Investment, Conflict of Laws, and the Privatization of Securities Law, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 331 (1992) (securities).

89. For a discussion of convergence of insider trading laws, see James A. Kehoe, Exporting
Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of U.S. Insider Trading Laws Internationally, 9 EMORY

INT'L L. REv. 345 (1985).
90. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 82 (noting that "antitrust itself has taken

root in many of our most important trading partners"). Cf Eleanor Fox, The End of Antitrust
Isolationism: The Vision of One World, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 221 (discussing the differences

and "disharmonies" that continue to exist across antitrust systems). Turning to the example of
financial supervision, this shift is also evident in the Basle Accords, which deal with
extraterritoriality problems in bank supervision through international financial regulations. See
Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking

Supervision, 39 VA. 1. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
91. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of International
Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1992); Merritt B. Fox, Securities
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997); Uri Geiger, The Casefor
Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 241 (1997); Hillman,
supra note 25.
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rules for application in cross-border transactions-has also made
progress. An excellent example of such developments is found in the
area of securities regulation: the adoption of international accounting
standards and international disclosure standards for use by issuers
engaged in cross-border securities offerings and exchange listings.92 The
Securities Exchange Commission's long-standing approach required
foreign issuers either to present their financial statements in accordance
with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, or to provide a
reconciliation to those principles;93 similarly, it required foreign issuers
to meet essentially the same non-financial disclosure standards as those
applied to domestic issuers. 9" In the mid-1980s, seeking to increase the
number of public foreign-issuer offerings in the United States, the
Commission began an intensive effort to develop a set of international
accounting standards and disclosure requirements for use in crossborder offerings. Working with the International Accounting Standards
Committee95 and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, the Commission assisted in the development of
standardized rules. IOSCO finalized a set of international rules in
1998,96 and in 1999 the Commission amended its disclosure
requirements in conformity with the IOSCO standards.97 While approval
of the financial standards proposed by the IASC is not yet finalized, the
Commission in 2000 issued a concept release endorsing the project.9"
92. See generally Steinberg and Michaels, supra note 80, at 236-38 (discussing steps taken
toward the development of harmonized rules for use in global securities offerings, and
highlighting the distinction between standardized rules for cross-border offerings and reciprocal
recognition rules for accepting disclosure based on other countries' standards).
93. The Commission did make a few accommodations to foreign issuers: cash flow
statements, for instance, could be made pursuant to International Accounting Standards rather
than U.S. accounting principles. See Cash Flow Standards, IAS #7 (1992).
94. In 1982, the Commission adopted the integrated disclosure system for use by nondomestic issuers. Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act
Release No. 6437 (1982). While this system facilitated the registration process, however, it did
not relax substantially the traditional disclosure requirements. See Edward F. Greene, Daniel A.
Braverman & Sebastian R. Sperber, Hegemony or Deference, 50 Bus. LAW. 413, 422 (1995)
("Although foreign private issuers were recognized as a class, deference to their home country
disclosure requirements was minimal."). Concessions in terms of disclosure include, for example,
the ability to disclose management compensation on an aggregate rather than an individual basis.
95. See supra note 81.
96. The requirements are available at http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/1998-intnl-disclosurestandards.html.
97. International Disclosure Standards, Securities Release No. 33-7745, 34-41936 (Sept. 28,
1999). Form 20-F, the combined registration and annual report form used by foreign private
issuers under the Exchange Act, was altered to incorporate the International Disclosure Standards,
and parallel changes were made in various related rules.
98. International Accounting Standards Concept Release, Securities Act Release No. 7801, 65
Fed. Reg. 8896 (Feb. 23, 2000). See discussion in Roberta S. Karmel, Will Convergence of
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With these changes, the Commission thus took a major step toward its
goal of promoting regulatory harmonization.99
As solutions such as these are developed, the instances of regulatory
conflict that would require application of a particular sovereign's
internal law will become less frequent.' 0 Taking the securities example:
once standardized rules have been adopted across jurisdictions, an issuer
engaging in a cross-border offering must simply comply with those
rules.' No analysis is necessary of whether a particular sovereign's

laws should be deferred to, or of which jurisdiction is most affected by
the transaction. A continued emphasis on the development of

harmonized rules for use in transnational business activity will therefore
result in a concomitant de-emphasis on the scope of sovereign authority.
C.

Coordination/Cooperation

Efforts focused on enhancing regulatory coordination and
cooperation in the international arena have taken place simultaneously
with the harmonization movement.' 2 These efforts involve a lesser
degree of intrusion on sovereignty than does harmonization in that they
seek to develop mechanisms for the more efficient application of
domestic laws in the cross-border context and therefore promote
national interests.' 3 Even these solutions, however, affect territorial
sovereignty in that they resolve jurisdictional conflicts by cooperation
rather than by privileging one state's authority over another's. Their
implementation affects conflicts across all areas of

FinancialDisclosureStandards Change SEC Regulation of ForeignIssuers?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 485, 497-500 (2000).
99. International Disclosure Standards, supra note 97.
100. See Steinberg and Michaels, supra note 80, at 236 ("In an increasingly global economy,
it may not be beneficial to regulators in every country where an offering occurs to demand access
to information and exercise the powers needed to achieve the perceived regulatory goals of that
jurisdiction....").
101. While the format in which such rules are adopted in each relevant jurisdiction might
differ, the substance will be uniform.
102. Cooperative measures are sometimes posited as an alternative to harmonization rather
than as a parallel development. In the area of antitrust regulation, for example, commentators
have noted that while the European Union favors a true harmonization approach, the United
States continues to pursue a system of cooperative enforcement of national laws. See Russell J.
Weintraub, Globalization'sEffect on Antitrust Law, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 27, 34 (1999); Spencer
Weber Waller, An International Common Law of Antitrust, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 163, 163
(1999) (noting that the debate over the direction of future international antitrust efforts is
"generally portrayed as a dichotomous choice" between these positions).
103. See Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in International
Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual PropertyRegime, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 277,
279 (2001) (suggesting that such cooperative networks "do not include the gradual ceding of
sovereignty to a central policymaking authority.").
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jurisdiction-judicial, legislative, and enforcement-and lessens
reliance on a balancing of the interests and power of individual states.
One particularly successful manifestation of the tendency toward

cooperation is the bilateral memorandum of understanding between
regulatory agencies, used in enforcing both antitrust and securities
regulations."~ Early agreements of this sort functioned primarily as
information-sharing agreements, intended to overcome the difficulties

regulatory agencies encountered in obtaining documents and testimony
from abroad." 5 Later agreements, however, both expanded the scope of
mutual assistance available and institutionalized what is referred to as

"positive comity," a principle under which agencies in one jurisdiction

may take action to protect the interests of another state.0 6 Prior to the
development of these agreements, the enforcement of national antitrust

and securities laws in cross-border cases raised issues of conflict
between sovereigns. To engage in investigations or other enforcement
activity within the territory of a foreign state would be viewed as an
intrusion on that state's sovereignty; 0 7 thus, any requests for
cooperation in such matters were handled within a framework of
competing sovereign authority.0 8 The newer generation of bilateral
agreements, by contrast, contemplates a

system of regulatory

enforcement that appears more as shared sovereignty."°9 Although the
goal of such agreements might be the protection by national regulators

of their regulatory capability,"0 the mechanisms put in place by such
104. Legislative authority enhancing regulatory capacity to enter into such agreements was
granted in the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-12
(antitrust) and in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, H.R. Rep.
100-910 (securities).
105. I discuss this generation of agreements at greater length in Hannah L. Buxbaum,
Cooperative InternationalRegulatory Enforcement and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

in the UnitedStates, 43 GERMAN YEARBOOK INT'L L. 171 (2000).
106. See Regulatory Cooperationfor Effectiveness and Compliance: Remarks by Diane P.

Wood, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROcS. 223, 229 (1997).
107. Hans W. Baade, The Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 429, 441

(1995) (describing the "core of public law" as "necessarily territorial.").
108. Buxbaum, supra note 105, at n.47.
109. See Commission Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application
of the Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States
of America Regarding the Application of their Competition Law, COM (96) 479 (October 8,
1996) (describing the positive comity provision in the Agreement as enabling "either Party [to]
invite the other Party to take, on the basis of the latter's legislation, appropriate measures
regarding anticompetitive behaviour implemented on its territory and which affects the important
interests of the requesting Party.").
110. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model ofInternational
Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925 (1996) for

a public-choice argument that securities regulators enter into cooperation agreements in order to
protect their own interests.
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agreements "could only be achieved by internationalizing regulatory
agencies, thereby rupturing the internal sovereignty of the State.""'
A similar trend is evident in the area of merger regulation. Regulatory
agencies in more than one country may seek to review and regulate a
particular cross-border merger." 2 While a traditional approach to such a
conflict might seek to allocate regulatory authority to a single country
based on the relative strength of the sovereigns' interest in the
transaction, there has developed (at least between the United States and
the European Union) some level of tolerance, among regulators as well

as multinational corporations, for joint review."' The bilateral
agreements provide for cooperation in this regard," 4 as does the WTO's
proposed notification system." 5 Accepting a sort of shared jurisdiction
obviates the need for one country to assert its sovereignty against the

other.
Cooperation-in this case, at the judicial level-has also become a
pillar of international bankruptcy reform. It was central to initiatives
such as the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat" 6 and the European
Insolvency Convention,"' both of which emphasized the need for active
collaboration by bankruptcy judges. Perhaps the most important recent

8
proposal in this area, the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,"
includes provisions requiring cooperation by judges in different
jurisdictions addressing international bankruptcy cases." 9 It is believed
that improving channels for communication and cooperation among

bankruptcy judges will enable those judges to resolve

complex

11. Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 425, 448-49 (1999).
112. E.g. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas: the United States would seek to regulate the
transaction on the jurisdictional basis of nationality (both companies were U.S. nationals), and the
European Union because the transaction would impact the common market.
113, See Sall K. Mehra, ExtraterritorialAntitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International
Consensus, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 191 (1999) (discussing the Boeing merger and pointing
out that no comity analysis was conducted in an effort to allocate regulatory jurisdiction to a
single country before the European Union blocked the merger). This is not to say that no friction
is caused by such joint reviews-this very merger is a good example of one that raised
considerable antagonism-but merely that regulators and regulated entities now perceive joint
review as commonplace.
114. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws,
July 11, 2000, U.S.-Mex., reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) p 13.509, Article IV
(Cooperation with Regard to Related Matters).
115. See Fiebig, supra note 83.
116. See supra note 75.
117. European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1223
(1996), discussed in Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings,
70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (1996).
118. See supra note 78.
119. Id, Articles 25 through 27.
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transnational bankruptcies in

an

equitable manner

despite

inconsistencies between the individual bankruptcy rules of different

jurisdictions involved. 2 ' In fact, the Model Law in that respect merely
reinforces a trend toward ad-hoc cooperative decision-making that is
evident in reorganizations and asset distributions concerning
multinational corporations. 2' In many cases, courts have developed
protocols for the resolution of bankruptcy proceedings, acceptable to the
parties involved, that harmonize inconsistent bankruptcy laws'2 2 rather
than choose the application of one country's law over another's.'23 This

approach therefore uses cooperation to avoid conflicts between the
domestic bankruptcy policies of different sovereigns.
D.

Conclusion

The trends outlined above illustrate the growing importance in
international economic law of solutions to regulatory conflict that
transcend sovereignty. 24 Consistent with the broader movements that
are part of globalization, these solutions look both to the supranational'2 5
and the subnational'26 level for alternatives to traditional analyses

grounded in territorialism. None of this is meant to suggest that
120. See. e.g., In re Brierly, 145 B.R. 151, 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("...it is critical to
harmonize the proceedings in the different courts lest decrees at war with one another result"); see
also Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-BorderInsolvency Cooperation Protocols,
33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 587, 600 (1998) ("Only [through cooperation] will available resources be used
to maximize the economic return to the parties involved, instead of being consumed in
jurisdictional disputes.").
121. See E. Bruce Leonard, The Way Ahead: Protocols in InternationalInsolvency Cases, 17
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (1999).
122. While much of the harmonization is accomplished on the procedural level,
extraregulatory decision-making does involve the harmonization of substantive bankruptcy law as
well. See Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, The Role of the Examiner as Facilitatorand
Harmonizer in the Maxwell Communication CorporationInternational Insolvency, in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 621,
626 (Jacob Ziegel ed., 1994) (describing the role of examiner in bankruptcy proceedings as that of
a facilitator seeming "to achieve the same goals sought by ADR techniques in general"). See also
6A WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 152:48 (2002),
discussing the Maxwell proceedings and the points at which inconsistent law was harmonized.
123. Robert B. Chapman, Judicial Abstention in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings:
Recent Protocols in Simultaneous Plenary Cases, 7 INT'L INSOL. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (noting that in
some concurrent proceedings a question left unanswered "was which insolvency proceedings was
to predominate over the others"). For a recent discussion and list of such protocols, see Evan D.
Flaschen, Anthony J. Smits & Leo Plank, Foreign Representatives in US. Chapter 11 Cases:
Fillingthe Void in the Law ofMultinational Insolvencies, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 3, 7-12 (2001).
124. See Caryn M. Chittenden, After the Fall of Maxwell Communications: Is the Time Right
for a MultinationalInsolvency Treaty?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 161 (1993).
125. In the case of harmonization.
126. In the case of party autonomy.
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sovereign states have no role left to play-after all, they still possess the
power to enforce legal norms, and notions of sovereignty and territory
remain relevant in many instances of conflict of international economic
laws. When, for example, a case raises directly a question of the
extraterritorial scope of U.S. regulatory law, the Supreme Court's
decision in Hartford Fire suggests the applicability of an analysis
strongly rooted in territorialism.' 27 And while international disclosure
standards may be used in cross-border offerings, liability in the
securities area is still evaluated under U.S. domestic standards. But in
the new regulatory framework described above, more and more
potential instances of regulatory conflict will be averted through such
solutions, and the issue of power over territory will diminish in
significance. 28
IV. FROM SOVEREIGNTY TO SUBSTANTIVISM IN THE PROTECTION OF

U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES
The preceding Part analyzed changes, prompted largely by the forces
of globalization, to the framework within which conflicts of regulatory
law are conceptualized and resolved. In this Part, I examine how private
international law rules work within this new framework to protect
domestic regulatory interests. I begin by discussing the traditional
mechanisms used in territorial sovereignty-based systems to ensure the
effectuation of the policy interests reflected in U.S. economic law, and
then analyze the alternative approaches that have developed in the
substantivist system.
A.

ProtectingU.S. Economic Policies in a Territorial-Sovereignty
System

Traditional methods used by courts to resolve conflicts between U.S.
and foreign economic laws view such conflicts through the lens of
sovereign power within a particular territory.'29 Consequently, those
methods seek to effectuate U.S. economic policies through territorial
means: the application of U.S. domestic law. 3 ° Considerations of the
127. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993). See infra note 171 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case. In addition, for instance, the Model Law in many
contexts privileges local over foreign proceedings, recognizing the primary authority of each
sovereign over assets found within its territory.
128. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Loss of Distance: Global Corporate Actors and Global
CorporateGovernance, 34 INT'L LAW. 963 (2000).
129. See supra Part II.
130. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, InternationalBankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98

MICH. L. REv. 2177, 2206 (2000), discussing the problem in bankruptcy: "The choice-of-law
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substance of competing laws-in service of an inquiry into whether
U.S. policies might be effectuated through application of non-U.S.
law-have played a distinctly secondary role.
1.

InternationalContractCases: ProtectingInterests by Limiting
PartyAutonomy

Because a sovereign's right to regulate economic activity within its
borders was traditionally seen to trump party autonomy, 3 ' application
of domestic economic laws in cases raising regulatory issues was simply
automatic. A consideration of whether the substance of the law chosen
by the parties might vindicate U.S. policies was unnecessary-no
alternative law could be chosen, as the forum could not be divested of
its power to apply domestic law when regulatory issues were raised.'32
Thus, in international contract litigation, U.S. economic policies were
protected in a direct, territorial manner: through the automatic
implementation of domestic law.
2.

Legislative JurisdictionCases

Both the jurisdictional bases for prescriptive jurisdiction and potential
limiting factors relevant to the scope of that jurisdiction are analyzed
within a framework of territorial authority.' Under that analysis, U.S.
economic policies are again protected by the preservation of the United
States' right to apply its own economic law to certain transnational
activity. The unilateralist approach (under which U.S. economic law
will be applied if a jurisdictional basis exists for the assertion of that
law) "34
' illustrates this territorialism most clearly. A unilateralist court
would not consider either the competing interests of another sovereign
in regulating the relevant activity or the substance of competing laws.' 35
Rather, U.S. policy interests raised by conduct that occurs or has effects
within U.S. territory would be effectuated through application of
domestic law itself: through the sovereign's assertion of its power to
problem is...
zero sum-where the values of two countries conflict, one must be chosen at the
expense of the other. The value of assets whose distribution is affected by the choice of law

regime represents the loss of sovereignty of one country in favor of that of another."
131. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.

132. See Baade, supra note 107, at 472 ("[Antitrust law] is necessarily mandatory, and at least
in its own terms not subject to indirect avoidance by contractual choice of law.").
133. See supra Part II.B.2.
134. See supra note 43.

135. It remains an open question whether such factors may be considered in a situation in
which the law of a foreign state had compelled the activity in question. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993).
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regulate. Indeed, it is precisely this focus on3 6territorial sovereignty that
recommends unilateralism to its proponents.
The interest-balancing approach to resolving questions of prescriptive
jurisdiction also addresses the protection of domestic economic policies
from a territorial standpoint, although-unlike unilateralism-it does
contain the seeds of a more substance-oriented analysis. After
establishing a jurisdictional basis to regulate certain activity, a court
using this approach must consider the reasonableness of an exercise of
jurisdiction by evaluating certain factors. While some are completely
territory-based,137 others include a substantive component in that they
seek to assess the interest of each state in regulating the activity.'38
Nevertheless, the inquiry is into the interest of each state in regulating
the conduct, not in a comparative evaluation of the substance of each
state's laws. 3 9 Any consideration of the content of those laws is

therefore a complement to, not a substitute for, a territorial, jurisdictionselecting analysis.
B.

The Shift to Substantivism

Because substantivism is a particular school of thought in conflicts
theory, it is important to pause for a moment to discuss terminology.
The prevalent choice-of-law approaches, unilateralism and
multilateralism, may be characterized as substance neutral; they focus
simply on locating the appropriate jurisdiction as a source of law. 4
Analysis of the substance of competing laws is concededly part of those
approaches. Unilateralists, for example, consider the substantive content
of potentially applicable law-but only to determine whether the law is
136. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d. 909, 921-23 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
137. See, e.g., FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 403(2)(a) (1987)
("[T]he link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state."); id. at § 403(2)(b) ("the
connections, such as nationality, residence, of economic activity, between the regulating state and
the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated").
138. See, e.g., id. at § 403(b)(2)(c) ("[T]he importance of regulation to the regulating state...

and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted."); id. at §
403(2)(f) ("the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system"); id. at § 403(2)(h) ("the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.").
139. Consider Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976): a
"difference in law or policy" might be relevant, but mainly because of foreign relations
repercussions. Cf Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979),

referring to the availability of a remedy abroad as one relevant factor in the analysis.
140. See MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE 110-11 (1995)

(discussing the substance neutrality of multilateralism). See also David F. Cavers, A Critique of
the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 178 (1933): "So long as deduction from

territorial postulates could indicate only one jurisdiction as a source of law in a given case, the
content of that law would be logically irrelevant." As discussed in Part II.A, unilateralism and

multilateralism are also used by analogy to resolve conflicts of prescriptive jurisdiction.
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indeed applicable, and therefore only as part of an inquiry into the reach
of the rule. 4 ' Multilateralists, similarly, must consider to some extent
the substantive content of competing laws in assessing the relative
interests of each jurisdiction in regulating the particular conduct; again,
however, this consideration of content takes place in the context of a
jurisdiction-selecting approach.' Substantive analysis therefore plays a
decidedly secondary role in systems using these approaches.'43 The term
substantivism, by contrast, is used to describe a choice-of-law
methodology whose goal is to select the better law in any given case."
Under this approach, the analysis of substantive content is central and
not merely an aspect of an otherwise territory- or sovereignty-based
approach. Under this approach, in other words, a court faced with a
choice-of-law problem will resolve it by choosing a law rather than a
jurisdiction. 4 '
In the international context, the substantivist approach has been used
as the basis of a theory under which special rules would be developed to
address cross-border transactions that cannot be satisfactorily regulated
by rules developed for purely domestic use." Professor von Mehren has
suggested three situations in which the development of substantive rules
would be appropriate:
In the first type of situation, the forum considers that two legal
orders are sufficiently concerned with a given situation that the
rules of both should be given effect, but the domestic rules do not
lend themselves to cumulative application .... The second
general class comprises situations which, because of their
141. See Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271,
284(1996).
142. See REIMANN, supra note 140, at 110-11.

143. In the case of multilateralism, substance plays an additional role in connection with the
public-policy escape mechanism. Once the proper jurisdiction has been identified, courts may
consider whether application of the chosen law would violate the public policy of the forum state.
If so, they may invoke the "public policy exception" in deciding instead to apply forum (U.S.)
law. Id. at 111; see also Cavers, supra note 140, at 183-84, for a discussion of the public policy
exception. This stage of the analysis therefore requires a look at the substance of competing laws.
144. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41

N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 295-304 (1966), for a discussion of this approach in the domestic context.
See generally Gerhard Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 RECUEIL DES COURS 91, 184-

85 (1964) (discussing the distinction between conflicts justice and substantive justice).
145. See Leflar, supra note 144, at 295-96, 302.

146. See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS 76-79, 376-78 (1965); Arthur T. von Mehren, Special Substantive Rulesfor Multistate
Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice ofLaw Methodology, 88 HARV.

L. REV. 347 (1974). On the need to distinguish domestic and international conflicts generally, see
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Pleafor Segregation, 41
MINN. L. REV. 717 (1957).
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multistate characteristics, involve considerations which do not
have particular significance in comparable domestic settings....
A third class of situations is presented only by cases of true
conflict, that is to say, situations in which two or more legal
orders have legitimate reasons to regulate the dispute that has
arisen, but hold mutually inconsistent views respecting the form
such regulation should take.'47
In each of those situations, then, the particular form of cross-border
conflict calls for a resolution technique that centers on substance rather
than territorial linkages. In the following section, I analyze ways in
which the developments outlined above have brought considerations of
substance to the forefront in the protection of U.S. economic policies.
The new substantivism is evident both in a change in private
international law doctrine itself and in a shift in the focus of conflict
resolution away from private international law rules.
1.

Substantivism in InternationalContractLitigation: Expanding
PartyAutonomy

As discussed above, one aspect of economic globalization is an
expansion of the role of private actors in the regulatory arena. 48 In the
area of international contract law, this expansion is manifested in a
direct change to private international law rules-an elimination of
previous limitations on the enforceability of private choice regarding
economic law. In the place of those limitations, courts have turned to
substantivism as a means of protecting U.S. regulatory interests.
Party autonomy in the selection of forum and governing law in
international contracts was traditionally restricted by the
characterization of regulatory law as an extension of sovereign
authority.'49 The well-known Supreme Court decision in Bremen v.
Zapata,50° however, began a gradual erosion of the importance of
sovereignty-based analysis in defining the enforceability of choice
clauses. While Bremen itself did not concern the potential application of
regulatory law, the strong endorsement in that case of party autonomy in
international contracts generally' was soon adopted in regulatory
147. Von Mehren, supra note 146, at 358-59.
148. See supra Part III.A.1.
149. See discussion supra Part IV.A.I.
150. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The decision established a presumption in favor of enforceability of
forum-selection clauses in international agreements. Id. at 15.
151. See id., 407 U.S. at 9, 13:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must
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cases.'52 Following Bremen, the Supreme Court enforced foreign
arbitration clauses in international contracts where the relevant litigation
involved claims under U.S. securities laws153 and antitrust laws.154 These
cases addressed only the agreement of the parties to arbitrate; at least at

the stage of enforcing the arbitration clauses, the Court in each case
believed it had no reason to assume that U.S. regulatory law would not
be applied in the arbitrations themselves.'55 Nevertheless, by holding
that the weight of the sovereign's interest in application of its economic
laws did not necessarily mandate consideration of claims under those
laws exclusively in domestic courts, the decisions reflected a shift away
from the territory-based approach to resolving conflicts in international
contracts. 56 Indeed, these decisions explicitly referred to the importance
of arbitration (a non-sovereign and non-territorial institution) to the
resolution of international commercial disputes generally." 7
In a critical move toward substantivism, more recent decisions took

the final step of endorsing party autonomy even in the selection of
governing law in international contracts raising regulatory issues. In a
series of cases arising out of the collapse of the Lloyd's insurance
market, eight federal appellate courts enforced forum-selection and
choice-of-law clauses in favor of the United Kingdom contained in
investment agreements signed by U.S. investors.' Unlike earlier
be resolved under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce
in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our
laws, and resolved in our courts.... The elimination of [uncertainty] by agreeing in
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in
international trade, commerce, and contracting.
152. I discuss these developments more thoroughly in Private Attorney General, supra note
13, at 239-44.
153. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
154. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
155. In Scherk, the contract included a choice-of-law clause in favor of Illinois law, 417 U.S.
at 508; in Mitsubishi, while the contract included a choice-of-law clause in favor of Swiss law,
counsel for Mitsubishi had conceded at oral argument that U.S. law applied to Soler's antitrust
claims, 473 U.S. at 637, fn.19.
156. Earlier cases had stressed the importance of the resolution in U.S. courts of any
regulatory claims. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953) (".. .[T]he protective
provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their
effectiveness...").
157. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516 (discussing the role of arbitration in securing "orderliness
and predictability"); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (discussing the role of arbitration in the
"international legal order").
158. Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992); Roby v.
Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir.
1993); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94
F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996); Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997);
Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998); Lipcon v. Underwriters at
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arbitration cases, these decisions explicitly accepted the displacement of
U.S. securities laws; they held that the choice clauses were enforceable
even though the U.S. parties would then be unable to assert claims
under U.S. securities laws.'59 The cases therefore did not view territorial
sovereignty as determinative; instead, they considered the question of
applicable economic law in light of whether the law chosen by the
parties was reasonable in light of U.S. policies. 6 '
Once the automatic supremacy of regulatory law over party
autonomy was eliminated in the context of international agreements, the
means by which U.S. regulatory policies were protected shifted as well.
Rather than being immune to party choice-and therefore applied as a
matter of territorial prerogative-they were protected by the back-up
mechanism of the public policy exception,"' in cases addressing the
enforceability of forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses, this
exception is invoked when application of the law chosen by the parties
(or of the law that would be applied in the forum selected by the
parties)' 62 would violate a public policy of the forum in which
enforcement of the clauses is sought. This analysis is by definition
substantive; a court must examine the substance of the chosen law to
determine the effect of its application. 63 Its implementation in cases
involving regulatory law has therefore led to the protection of U.S.
policy interests through a condition of substantive similarity between
domestic and chosen law. U.S. law might not, as before, be applied as a
matter of course; but if the chosen law is similar enough to U.S. law,
then domestic economic policies will be served even upon application
of that foreign law.
In the Lloyd's cases discussed above, the courts held that the
application of U.K. rather than U.S. securities laws to fraud claims
brought by U.S. investors was acceptable precisely because of the

Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998).
159. See McConnaughay, supra note 17, at 280-83.
160. See further discussion infra Part V.A. See also Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d
716 (9th Cir. 1999), for a case extending this approach to the antitrust context. This development

in the international arena is also consistent with the shift, brought about by the "conflicts
revolution," from a focus on territorial links to a focus on state interest. Reimann, supra note 27,
at 584.
161. See McConnaughay, supra note 17, at 265, for a discussion of the difference between
the inapplicability of choice-of-law analysis in certain areas (those governed by mandatory law)

and the operation of the public policy exception within choice-of-law analaysis.
162. The exception is also available to prevent application of the law that would otherwise
have been the result of choice-of-law analysis absent party choice.

163. See Cavers, supra note 140, at 183 (describing the invocation of the public policy
exception as "a frank discarding of the blindfold" imposed by traditional jurisdiction-selecting
conflicts rules).
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substance of those laws. The first circuit court to address the Lloyd's
situation spoke only to a very general fairness requirement, essentially

verifying merely that a fraud claim against Lloyd's was actionable in
the United Kingdom."6 The decisions that followed, however, engaged

in detailed analysis of the substance of U.K. securities laws in
comparison with those of the United States. On the basis of that

analysis, the courts concluded that the economic policies underpinning
U.S. securities laws would be effectuated even upon application of U.K.

law.'65 A subsequent Ninth Circuit case applied this approach in the
antitrust context, concluding that the application of foreign antitrust law
would not necessarily offend the policies reflected in U.S. antitrust

statutes." 6 In the manner in which they effectuate U.S. regulatory
policies, these decisions reflect a shift in focus from sovereignty to
substantivism. The primary concern is not the authority of the United
States to apply domestic law to the plaintiffs' regulatory claims, but
rather the substantive similarity of the chosen law to that of the United
States.167

In the bankruptcy arena, interestingly, this attention to substantivism
developed earlier: in cases of conflict between U.S. and foreign
bankruptcy law, courts considered among other things the substance of

the foreign law.'68 Consider, for example, a situation in which a U.S.
164. Riley, 969 F.2d at 958.
165. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1365-66 (concluding that "there are ample and just remedies
under English law" and that the "well-developed English law of fraud and misrepresentation"
would not offend U.S. policies); Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161-62 (discussing the similarity of the two
laws and concluding that "several remedies in England vindicate plaintiffs' substantive rights");
Shell, 55 F.3d at 1230-31 (following Roby, Bonny and Riley); Allen, 94 F.3d at 929 (stating that
U.S. anti-fraud policy would not be subverted because "British law not only prohibits fraud and
misrepresentation as do the United States securities laws, but also affords [plaintiffs] adequate
remedies in the United Kingdom"); Haynsworth, 121 F.3d 956, 968-70 (while stating broadly that
foreign remedies need not "duplicate those available under American law," noting the protections
afforded by English law and concluding that "plaintiffs' remedies in England are adequate to
protect their interests and the policies behind the statutes at issue"); Richards, 135 F.3d at 129495 (enforcing the choice clauses in part "because English law provides the [plaintiffs] with
sufficient protection"); Lipcon, 148 F. 3d at 1299 (citing Bonny, 3 F.3d at 162, and concluding
that "'available remedies and potential damage recoveries suffice to deter deception of American
investors[,] to induce [disclosure],' and to provide redress" and therefore serve U.S. policies).
166. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 723 (9th Cir. 1999).
167. For an argument that the laws were not in fact similar enough to protect U.S. policies,
see Courtland H. Peterson, Choice of Law and Forum Clauses and the Recognition of Foreign
Country Judgments Revisited Through the Lloyd's of London Cases, 60 LA. L. REv. 1261, 127374 (2000); Richards, 135 F.3d at 1299 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. Perhaps substantivism was integrated into bankruptcy analysis earlier because
bankruptcy, in contrast to antitrust and securities law, involves aspects of private as well as
regulatory law. 6A WILLIAM A. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2d §
152:14 (1997).
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court is called upon to decide whether assets of the insolvent located
within the United States should be distributed to U.S. creditors under
U.S. distribution rules, or should instead be remitted for distribution in
an ongoing foreign proceeding, under foreign law. The U.S. Bankruptcy
Code sets forth a list of relevant factors to assist courts in making this
decision; one of these factors is whether distribution of assets under the
foreign bankruptcy regime would take place "substantially in
accordance" with the order in which assets would be distributed under
U.S. law. 69 This factor thus introduces a substantive element into the
analysis: the implication is that U.S. interests can be protected not only
by the exercise of sovereign power (application of domestic law) but
also by means of a substantive solution (application of another law
whose substance is acceptable to the U.S. court). 7 Again, the focus is
not on sovereign authority but on substantive comparability of the
relevant laws.
2.

Substantivism and Solutions to Overlaps of Prescriptive
Jurisdiction

Private international law on prescriptive jurisdiction has not explicitly
embraced substance-oriented solutions. Quite to the contrary, the
Supreme Court's most recent decision in this area adopted a decidedly
territorialist approach.'71 Although globalization has not directly
affected private international law jurisprudence in this area, it has,
however, had a substantial effect on the scope of application of private
international law. Where successful, both harmonization and
coordination efforts reduce the need to apply traditional private
international law analysis; their purpose is to minimize the likelihood
that one sovereign's law needs to be chosen over another's. Thus, the
development of harmonization and cooperation solutions has shifted
many conflicts outside the province of private international law rules.
Because such solutions are themselves so dependent on substantive
169. BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4)(2000). See Remington Rand Corp. v. Bus.
Sys., Inc., 830 F.2d 1260 (3rd Cir. 1987), for a discussion of the need to analyze the substance of
competing foreign law. See also Rethinking InternationalInsolvency, supra note 21, at 66-68
(criticizing interpretation of this factor in certain cases).
170. Although individual courts have accorded disparate weight to this particular factor,
many have viewed it more or less as a condition to deference. See, e.g., In re Toga Mfg., 28 B.R.
165, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (refusing to defer to a foreign proceeding on the ground of

lack of similarity); see also Rasmussen, supra note 70, at 20 n.92 ("Proponents of modified
universalism contend that a U.S. bankruptcy court should defer to a foreign proceeding only when
the foreign law is similar to U.S. law.").

171. In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), the Court rejected interest
balancing and emphasized the absolute right of a sovereign to regulate conduct occurring or
having effects within its borders.
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considerations, the result is that the territorial-sovereignty focus found
in traditional prescriptive jurisdiction analysis has been largely replaced
by a focus on substantive solutions.
a.

Harmonization
A focus on the substance of competing rules is an inevitable aspect
of
the movement toward harmonization of economic laws, whether by
means of the convergence of national laws, the development of
supranational law, or the creation of uniform rules for use in crossborder cases.172 Where the goal is the development of substantive
uniform law, work must necessarily begin with a substantive
examination of existing national laws. The focus is not merely on
substance, moreover, but on similarity of substance. As is often
observed, the project of harmonization is only viable when the laws to
be harmonized are not too far apart to begin with.73 In the antitrust area,
for example, commentators point to the growing emergence of similar
anti-competition prohibitions across jurisdictions as a sign that the
unification process might become possible. 74 The success of the limited
harmonization measures in international securities law, likewise,
depended largely on the basic similarity of pre-existing approaches to
disclosure and accounting standards.'75 In areas in which the
corresponding laws of various jurisdictions lack sufficient similarity,
harmonization efforts founder. In bankruptcy, fundamental
inconsistencies across jurisdictions in both bankruptcy and related laws
make harmonization appear unattainable;'7 6 similarly, inconsistencies in
the antitrust enforcement processes in certain countries have been
identified as potential barriers to the harmonization process in that

172. See supra Part III.B. for a description of these varieties of harmonization efforts.
173. See Trautman, supra note 17, at 591 ("The need for unitary regulation is plainer in those
areas where the regulatory policies of various countries conflict, and yet it is probably in those
areas that there is the least hope for any kind of international judicial or executive cooperation.").
174. See generallyBasedow, supra note 88, at 1046-48 (noting this argument and discussing
the future of harmonization given different degrees of convergence).
175. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in US. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1200, 1211 (1999). There is, of course, an independent policy reason for "fram[ing] the debate
solely in terms of the comparability of IAS measurement standards vis-a-vis U.S. GAAP," id.,
which is that the key to securities disclosure is the ability of investors to compare issuers seeking
capital. Id. at 1211-17.
176. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in InternationalBankruptcy: A Post-Universalist
Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 696 (1999). But see Westbrook, supra note 79, at 2291
("[G]lobal economic integration is driving convergence of law at a surprisingly fast pace and this
trend will make it possible to achieve a workable international bankruptcy system much sooner
than had been thought.").
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area.'77 U.S. harmonization efforts are therefore focused in areas where

domestic regulatory policies are least at risk because the harmonized
standards will be sufficiently similar to domestic law.

b.

Cooperation

Because coordination mechanisms are designed merely to facilitate
the application of national laws in cross-border situations, they may be
viewed primarily as procedural developments that do not alter the way
in which U.S. policies are effectuated. While they may have made the

enforcement process less territory-driven,'

in other words, they do not

alter the fact that U.S. policies are implemented through application of
U.S. law. Nevertheless, such mechanisms are to some degree part of the

move toward substantivism.
Early memoranda of understanding were overtly substance-oriented
in that they conditioned enforcement assistance on substantive similarity
of the relevant laws; a regulatory agency would not initiate investigative
or enforcement activity at the request of its partner agency unless the
conduct in question violated regulatory laws in its own jurisdiction as
well.' To this extent, as some have argued, even cooperation at the
level of enforcement-as opposed to cooperation in unifying underlying
law-requires a common understanding of regulatory goals. 8 ' Later
agreements dispensed with this requirement, incorporating instead
provisions that require assistance even absent shared violations. 8 ' In the
177. Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms andInstitutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 478 (2000); see also DIANE P. WOOD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE 1995 ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (1995):
"The commitment of other countries to antitrust rules and enforcement practices that are
compatible, even if not identical, with those of the United States opens up exciting possibilities
for cooperative efforts that we are just beginning to explore."
178. See discussion supra Part III.C. of the diminishing role of territory in regulatory
enforcement actions.
179. SEC Speaks in 1998: International Developments, 1037 PRACTISING LAW
INST./CORPORATE LAW 149, 156 (1998) (discussing memoranda of understanding between
securities regulators); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE supra note 177, at 5 (discussing memoranda of
understanding between antitrust regulators).
180. See James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an
InternationalizedMarketplace, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 77, 83 (1992).
181. See Principles for Memoranda of Understanding, Technical Committee, International
Organization of Securities Commissions 1991, Principle I ("MOUs should provide that
investigatory assistance will be granted without regard to whether the type of conduct under
investigation would be a violation of the laws of the Requested Authority."); Agreement Between
the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the
Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, June 4,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 1070, at Article III, providing that a request for assistance "may be made
regardless of whether the activities also violate the Requesting Party's competition laws...." See
generally MICHAEL ABBELL AND BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
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case of these later memoranda of understanding, however, a focus on
substance comes from another source: the use of such agreements as a
means to achieve the end of harmonization. Because cooperation in

enforcement is viewed as creating a foundation for later cooperation in
the development of uniform substantive standards, 8 2 bilateral
agreements are part of the effort to unify regulatory policy across

different jurisdictions.'83 In this sense, they invite attention to the
substance of the regulatory law in partner jurisdictions.
Cooperation in international bankruptcy, in the form of coordinated

joint proceedings, 8 also reflects an emphasis on substantive similarity
in addressing conflicts of competing policies. In crafting joint solutions
to cross-border bankruptcies, bankruptcy judges do not necessarily
implement the bankruptcy laws of one jurisdiction or another. Instead,
they develop ad-hoc agreements between debtors and creditors that seek
to harmonize those laws.'85 Like legislative harmonization, this process

necessarily presupposes some basic compatibility of the policies
underpinning the rules concerned.'86 If the basic policies served by the
competing rules are close enough in substance, a bankruptcy court may
develop a protocol that eliminates the need to select one jurisdiction's
policy over another's.'87 Additionally, with respect to the legislative

proposals addressing transnational insolvency law,8 8 efforts even at
(CRIMINAL), § 12-3-8 (1997).
182. Paul G. Mahoney, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: An InternationalPerspective,
7 YALE J. ON REG. 305, 320 (1990) ("Internationalization has also provided the SEC with
opportunities to use its enforcement powers as a lever to press for greater cooperation and
uniformity among the world's securities regulators."); Weintraub, supra note 102, at 35 (1999)
(discussing antitrust regulations). But see Spencer Weber Walter, National Laws and
International Markets: Strategies of Cooperation and Harmonization in the Enforcement of
CompetitionLaw, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1111, 1119 (1996), suggesting that cooperation is chosen
as a method precisely because it will defeat any move toward an international antitrust system.
183. See Zaring, supra note 62, at 284.
184. See discussion of extra-regulatory decision-making, supra Part III.C.
185. Flaschen & Silverman, supra note 123, at 629 (discussing the Maxwell protocol and
noting that "the Order and Protocol... constitutes something of a bilateral treaty on the
international insolvency of MCC, created to facilitate the harmonization of the United States' and
Europe's respective insolvency systems for the benefit of MCC and its creditors").
186. See Flaschen & Silverman, supra note 122, at 599, discussing protocols:
Perhaps where the relevant fora have common legal traditions... Protocols can be more
specific and detailed about the substantive rules that will govern the proceedings. Where
the relevant fora utilize legal systems that are less common,.. . Protocols may need to
focus more on process, serving more as a framework for communication and
cooperation....
187. Id. at 600 (in supporting such proceedings, urging a focus on the policy common to
virtually all systems: "that the essence of insolvency law.., is the maximization of value for all
concerned").
188. See discussion of the Model Law and other transnational initiatives, supra notes 75-78
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improving procedural coordination are viewed as a means to the end of
substantive harmonization.'8 9 As in the areas of antitrust and securities,
then, these efforts invite a focus on similarity of laws.
3.

Conclusion

As methods for resolving conflicts of regulatory authority have
moved away from territorial notions of sovereignty to more substantive
solutions, they have also caused a shift in how we conceive of the
implementation of domestic regulatory policy in the international arena.
Rather than viewing the matter as an exercise of sovereign
authority--of the right of the United States to set policy with regard to
conduct occurring within its territory 9 -- the question more frequently
is whether the substantive solution proposed comes close enough to
effectuating domestic policy.
V.

THE COST OF SUBSTANTIVISM

Adopting methods that emphasize substance over territorial authority
in the regulation of cross-border economic activity, and in litigation
arising from that activity, is in many respects advantageous. Such
methods quite properly challenge what Professor Juenger characterized
as the unstated assumption concealed in the phrase 'choice of law':
"that the only way to resolve multistate problems is to select one or the
other from among two or more 'conflicting' municipal laws."' 91 These
methods take account of the globalization of economic markets and the
continually decreasing importance of territorial boundaries in the
conduct of international commerce. In addition, they permit the
protection of U.S. regulatory policies without requiring insistence on the
application of U.S. domestic law. At the same time, however,
substantivism in the resolution of regulatory conflicts imposes certain
costs. In this Part, I analyze two particular risks: the potential overapplication of U.S. law, and the potential for process-related unfairness
in the resolution of economic conflicts. I conclude by arguing for
continued attention to territorial authority in international economic law.

and accompanying text.
189. Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of InternationalBankruptcy Law: A United States

Persepctive, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2543, 2561 (1996) ("Attempting to achieve limited but key
procedural targets such as access and recognition, and foregoing the temptation to deal with socalled substantive issues, provides a platform from which to achieve real progress.").
190. See supra Part III.A.
191. See MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 5.
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Potential Over-Applicationof U.S. Law

As discussed in Part IV.B. above, U.S. courts have in recent years
enforced forum-selection and governing-law clauses in international
contracts despite the presence of claims under U.S. regulatory law. This
Part explores two reasons that this approach in contract litigation may
lead to the over-application of U.S. law: first, the substantivist approach
articulated in those cases may yield improper results when the selected
law is not substantially similar to that of the United States; and second,
that approach may create a hidden incentive favoring convergence
toward U.S. law.
1.

Operationof the SubstantivistApproach When DissimilarLaw
Is Chosen

In the Lloyd's cases, the appellate courts considered whether the
forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses contained in the investment
agreements were enforceable despite the assertion by plaintiffs of
claims under U.S. securities laws."9 The courts therefore began their
analysis not by considering the applicability of U.S. securities laws to
the transactions in question (that is, the existence of prescriptive
jurisdiction), but by considering whether the policies embodied in those
laws would be violated by application of the chosen law.'93 The courts
answered this question in the negative, on the basis that the chosen law
was similar enough to that of the United States, and therefore never
explicitly considered whether U.S. law in fact applied to the relevant
transactions at all. Perhaps because they did not engage in a thorough
analysis of prescriptive jurisdiction, they paid relatively little attention
to the specific connections of the transactions to the United States and
the United Kingdom. 94 Most of the courts rested with the observation
that the agreements were "truly international;"' 95 those that considered

192. See supra Part IV.B.I.
193. Id.In other words, the courts treated such cases as regular international contract disputes
rather than according them special treatment due to the regulatory issues involved. They therefore
applied the analysis developed in Bremen v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (expanded, as

described above, to encompass choice of law as well as choice of forum), under which
enforcement of choice clauses may be denied if it "would contravene a strong public policy of the

forum in which suit is brought."
194. An analysis of these connections, at least sufficient to establish the existence of a

jurisdictional basis to regulate, would have been central to a determination of whether U.S. law
applied to the transactions.

195. See, e.g., Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, 969 F.2d 953, 957 (10th Cir. 1992);
Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyds, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993); Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London,
121 F.3d 956, 967 (5thCir. 1997).
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jurisdictional contacts focused on the number of contacts with the
foreign forum, 9 6 with few discussing the contacts with the United States
other than to observe the involvement of U.S. investors. 97 Only one

court mentioned specifically the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities
laws, and that was to suggest that those laws did not in fact reach the
investment transaction.' 8 (Of course, on the facts presented in the
Lloyd's cases, it seems quite possible that the courts simply concluded
summarily that the contacts overwhelmingly were with the United
Kingdom and therefore spent little time on the question.' 99)
What would the result have been, though, if the law chosen by the
parties had been not U.K. law, but a law not substantially similar to that
of the United States?2" On the substantivist analysis adopted in the
Lloyd's cases, a court faced with such a situation would decline to
enforce the choice clauses, on the ground that application of dissimilar
law would subvert U.S. public policy. The litigation initiated in the U.S.
court under U.S. securities laws would then proceed-and at that point,
the court would be required to consider the reach of those laws to the
conduct in question. If after examining the transactions' jurisdictional
contacts with the United States2"' the court determined that U.S.
securities laws did not reach the defendants' conduct, the court would
dismiss the case.202
For two reasons, this method is problematic. First, an analysis of
choice clauses that takes as its starting point a substantive comparison
of forum law and chosen law is inconsistent with the traditional
approach to such clauses. In non-regulatory cases, courts considering
foreign choice clauses generally begin by examining the connections of
196. See, e.g., Riley, 969 F.2d at 957; Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294
(9thCir. 1998).
197. See, e.g., Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1365 (2d Cir. 1993) ("American
investors.., actively solicited in the United States."). But see Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d

923, 929 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing the multiple U.K. contacts and stating that "the United States
nexus to the transactions involved ... is thus incidental and tangential.").
198. Allen, 94 F.3d at 930 (suggesting that applying U.S. law in the face of insubstantial
contacts with the United States would "violate the most fundamental precepts of international

comity").
199. In the Lloyd's cases, the U.S. plaintiffs were sophisticated investors who had traveled to
the United Kingdom to execute the investment agreements. The sales involved neither activity on
a U.S. securities exchange nor substantial preparatory negotiations or other conduct in the United

States.
200. That is, a law that did not provide remedies for claims such as those brought by the U.S.
investors.
201. And, in some courts, after considering also the U.K. interest in regulating the conduct.
See supra notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text.
202. Because courts will not apply the regulatory law of another country, a finding that
prescriptive jurisdiction is lacking will lead to dismissal rather than the application of foreign law;
see discussion supra note 17.
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the contract with the forum territory and with the chosen territory.2"3
According to the "doctrine of relativity," as Professor Nussbaum
described it, even a foreign law contrary to the public policy of the U.S.
forum would be applied if the connections with the U.S. forum were
remote. 2' 4 The initial examination of territorial contacts therefore
provides the context in which the competing policies are considered.0 5
Particularly in disputes involving regulatory claims, courts should
examine territorial contacts in this manner; analysis beginning instead
with substantive-law comparisons invites the criticism, frequently levied
against U.S. judicial and regulatory authorities, that the United States
evaluates the merits of foreign regulatory regimes by domestic
standards. Although some of the Lloyd's courts may have given
territorial interests short shrift simply because of the facts presented in
those cases, future courts should be careful to consider them.20 6
More importantly, and precisely because the enforceability analysis
in cases involving regulatory laws is not identical to the comparable
analysis in cases that do not implicate regulatory law, courts that have
rejected choice clauses on substantive grounds may feel justified in
subsequently applying U.S. law even where the case for its application
is weak. In cases that do not involve regulatory claims, a court that
declines to enforce a choice-of-law clause will then apply domestic
conflicts rules to ascertain applicable law. To illustrate: the U.S. party to
a contract brings suit in U.S. court, and its German counterparty moves
for dismissal on the basis of a forum-selection clause in favor of a
German court. The motion is denied because the contract also contains a
choice-of-law clause in favor of German law, whose application would
violate a U.S. policy. At that stage, the U.S. court will apply the
conflicts law of the state in which it sits to determine the law governing
the contract. If those conflicts rules lead back to German law, the court
203. See, e.g., Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988)
(examining relative contacts with the jurisdictions involved before analyzing policy in question).
204. Arthur Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49

YALE L.J. 1027, 1030-31 (1940) ("... a foreign law which in itself is repugnant to the forum will
be accorded recognition where the repercussion of that law upon the forum is remote and

unharmful ... [a]ll depends on the circumstances, or, more precisely, on the importance of the
'contacts' of the case with the territory of the forum.").
205. See Michael Mousa Karayanni, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of
Forum Selection Clauses, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1009, 1025 (1996) (noting that "[i]t is often stated
that a strong connection between the forum and the controversy is needed in order to justify the

application of the forum's public policy.").
206. In the Simula case, for instance, the Ninth Circuit did not consider territorial contacts at
all, asking simply "whether law of the [selected] court is so deficient that the plaintiffs would be

deprived of any reasonable recourse." Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 723 (9th Cir.
1999).
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will again decline to apply it on the same policy grounds.207 It would
then apply forum law to decide the case.208
In cases involving regulatory claims, however, the analysis is
different. Having declined to enforce choice clauses, a court must
inquire whether U.S. regulatory law reaches the transactions-but if it
does not, the court must dismiss the case. Because a court will not apply
the regulatory laws of other jurisdictions, it has no other option.20 9 The
result, then, is exactly the same as that achieved by enforcing the
clauses to begin with: dismissal of the case. Courts may be reluctant in
effect to undo their earlier decision not to dismiss, however, and
therefore may take a broad view of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law.
In the Lloyd's litigation itself, both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in
fact suggested that the necessary consequence of declining enforcement
of the choice clauses would be the application of U.S. regulatory law to
the plaintiff's claims. The Ninth Circuit noted that "[t]his assertion [that
Bremen analysis does not apply over the statutory anti-waiver
provision], if true, expands the reach of federal securities law to any and
' 210
all such transactions, no matter how remote from the United States;
the Eleventh Circuit, that "to invalidate the choice provisions ...

in

effect would be to conclude that 'the reach of the United States
securities laws [is] unbounded.' 21 ' The courts clearly made these
observations in support of strong enforcement of choice clauses-that

is, as part of an argument that U.S. law should not be applied reflexively
in international transactions.2 2 But in situations in which the substanceoriented policy analysis does not permit application of the parties'
chosen law, this linkage of non-enforcement with automatic application
of U.S. regulatory law creates the potential for over-application of U.S.
law; certain courts might let their reluctance to dismiss the case dictate
an over-extension of prescriptive jurisdiction.2"3
207. Because the public policy exception applies to law chosen through application of
conflicts rules, as well as law chosen by the parties. See discussion supra note 143.
208. The result would be similar to that which has developed in the bankruptcy arena under §
304(c) practice. A system under which U.S. law can be applied if the conflicting law is dissimilar
may lead to the over-application of U.S. law; see Rethinking InternationalInsolvency, supra note

21, at 66-68 (criticizing prospective substantive analysis of competing laws).
209. Thus, it cannot use forum law as a back-up.
210. Richards, 135 F.3d at 1293.
211. Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1295, citing Richards, 135 F.3d at 1293.

212. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, spoke against "expanding the operation of U.S.
securities law in the international arena." Richards, 135 F.3d at 1293-94, citing Haynsworth, 121
F.3d at 966.
213. Such an approach might permit the reflexive application of U.S. law even in situations in
which U.S. interests are relatively weak compared to the interests of a foreign jurisdiction. While
substantive comparability of conflicting laws is important, it should supplement, not replace, a
substance-neutral consideration of the relative interests of sovereigns involved in a regulatory
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One way to avoid this anomaly would be to consider relative
territorial contacts should the substantivist analysis raise policy
concerns: in other words, even if the chosen law is not similar enough to
U.S. law to serve U.S. policies, it should not be rejected if the United
States has only a tangential interest in the transaction. 1 4 This solution
would retain the basic framework in which choice clauses are
traditionally considered, while acknowledging the particular
complexities involved when regulatory issues are raised. It obviously
reintroduces considerations of sovereignty and territoriality into the
analysis, as it looks to the regulatory authority of the United States as a
factor in resolving conflicts created by the use of foreign choice
clauses.2 15 But it is precisely those considerations that give this approach
a sensitivity to such conflicts that the substantivist approach alone lacks,
in that the former approach recognizes and seeks to resolve the conflict
of economic laws underlying the contract question.216 It recognizes that
where the links to the United States are comparatively weak, deference
to the law chosen by the parties--even where that law is not similar to
conflict.
214. In discussing the substantive approach in the context of private laws, Professor Kegel
noted the continuing relevance of "the strength of the rival connecting factors." Kegel, supra note
144, at 241. See Reimann, supra note 27, at 590, discussing, in the contract context, the need for
an intermediate solution between territorial choice and state interest analysis.
215. This approach echoes the "shared values". analysis proposed as a mechanism for
resolving conflicts of regulatory jurisdiction in extraterritoriality cases. See Bernhard Grossfeld &
C. Paul Rogers, A Shared Values Approach to JurisdictionalConflicts in InternationalEconomic
Law, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 931 (1983). That approach advocated a shift in emphasis from the
interests of the respe.ctive countries in regulating the conduct to the policy values reflected in their
respective laws. If those values were found to'be similar, then the need to apply forum law was
diminished. Like the Lloyd's cases, this analysis recognized that domestic policy interests might
be served by the application of foreign law as well as through insistence on the direct application
of U.S. statutes. Unlike the courts in the Lloyd's cases, however, the proponents of that approach
grappled with the question of an ongoing role for traditional jurisdiction-selection factors. They
included a qualification in their analysis: if the foreign interests in regulating the conduct were
insubstantial compared with those of the United States, then application of U.S. law would be
considered appropriate even given similar values. Id. at 943. In considering what'role territorybased analysis should play in a situation where values were not shared, one of the authors of the
shared values approach suggested that in such a case interest balancing was not necessary and
U.S. law should be applied. See also C. Paul Rogers, Still Running Against the Wind: A Comment
on Antitrust Jurisdiction and Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 50 J. AIR. L. &
COM. 931 (1985).
In a sense, the solution described herein, for application in contract cases, reverses that
qualification proposed by the authors of the shared-values approach: it suggests that if U.S.
interests in regulating the conduct are insubstantial,. then application of the chosen law would be
appropriate even given dissimilar values.
216. It resolves this conflict differently, though, from those who suggest a return to the flat
unenforceability of choice clauses in cases involving regulatory claims. See, e.g., McConnaughay,
supra note 17.
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U.S. law-may be appropriate." 7

2.

Implied Incentives Toward Convergence

An approach to private international law that supports the
predictability critical to commercial transactions only when the chosen
law is close enough to U.S. law also creates certain incentives favoring

convergence toward U.S. law. It suggests, first of all, that parties
concerned about the enforceability of their choice of law in U.S. courts

will select either U.S. law or substantively similar foreign law to govern
their transactions. By influencing the outcome of party choice, U.S.
conflicts rules may therefore play a role in the spread of U.S. regulatory
policies in the international arena, as parties will then conform their

behavior to meet those substantive standards. Such preference for
"favored" systems may in turn encourage countries whose regulatory
laws are not sufficiently similar to U.S. law to conform their regulations

to meet U.S.

standards." 8

In this larger movement toward

harmonization, U.S. conflicts law might in this way act as a lever
forcing convergence. Because it operates outside the political process

that generally structures the harmonization movement,2"9 its possible
influence in this regard deserves careful consideration.

The potential effect of private international law rules in promoting
convergence is also important because such convergence will inevitably
decrease the diversity in regulatory systems.220 The benefits and
disadvantages of such an effect on regulatory diversity are much
debated: some commentators have suggested that a decrease will at least

217. This has been recognized in the context of prescriptive jurisdiction analysis. See Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975): U.S. law does not apply
extraterritorially "where the United States activities are merely preparatory or take the form of
culpable non-feasance and are relatively small in comparison to those abroad."
218. See generally WIENER, supra note 3, at 134-50 (discussing more broadly the
mechanisms "that could pressure other states to conform to the standards emerging across the
Atlantic"). Wiener also warns of the "tyranny of sameness" that may accompany transnational
harmonization of laws. Id. at 195, quoting DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1996).
219. Harmonization is a "political or legislative decision to sacrifice regulatory diversity in
favor of trade benefits." Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in FinancialServices under GATS, NAFTA and
the EC: A Regulatory JurisdictionAnalysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 121 (1995). That

political process itself has been the subject of much debate, as many critics of globalization have
identified lack of political legitimacy as a danger in the harmonization movement. See, e.g.,
Stephan, supra note 86, at 752-61; see generally articles collected in Part VII (Transatlantic
Regulatory Cooperation, Democracy, and Accountability), in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS (George A. Bermann et al. eds.,
2000). It is important to recognize the role that judicially created conflicts rules might play in
contributing to that danger.
220. See Zaring, supra note 62.
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prevent the erosion of certain minimum standards,22' while others have

praised diversity as central to the evolution of an optimal global
regulatory framework. 2 My intention here is not to join in this debate
as to the value of global regulatory competition, but to draw attention to
the role that conflicts rules may play in reducing the level of that

competition. Regardless of whether a decline in regulatory diversity is
perceived as a good, the possible role of a substantivist conflicts
approach in contributing to regulatory homogeneity deserves explicit
consideration in that debate.

B.

The Development of SubstantivistSolutions and Fairnessin the
Resolution of Economic Conflicts
A primary weakness of a private international law system based on

principles of sovereignty is that each conflict of laws takes on the
character of a conflict between sovereigns, as the question in each case

is which sovereign will exert its regulatory power. On that view, foreign
relations issues infuse even litigation between private parties.223 The

related strength of such a system, however, is that the competing laws
meet on the basis of equality-that is, the choice of law (or the decision
whether to apply domestic law to extraterritorial conduct) is made not
on the basis of relative power of the respective sovereigns but on the
basis of connections of the transaction in question to the respective
countries. 224 By contrast, the use of harmonization and cooperation
mechanisms to resolve instances of economic conflict, and the
221. Compare Stephan, supra note 86, at 795 (1999) (arguing that an ability to insist on laws
similar to domestic law may prevent a "race to the bottom.") with Romano, supra note 69, at
2430 n.216 (arguing that it only makes sense to encourage diversity if the competition results in a
race to the top, thus benefiting investors). See also James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in
Securities Markets: An Approach for Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure

Philosophies, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.149, 157 (1993), for a discussion of the pros
and cons of regulatory diversity.
222. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1855, 1875 (1997) (describing as

"welfare improving" the existence of a broad spectrum of securities regimes). While the authors
do not suggest that diversity is "a good in and of itself," id. at 1883, they argue the benefits of a
market-based competitive process in which the market arrives at the amount of diversity among
regimes. They argue further that too high a degree of convergence interferes with that competitive
process, id. at 1907. See also Eleanor M. Fox, The End of Antitrust Isolationism: The Vision of

One World, 1992 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 221 (noting the advantages of diversity across antitrust
regimes).

223. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 251-55, for a discussion of this aspect of private
litigation.
224. While a decision by a forum court to apply local rather than foreign law, or to apply
regulatory law extraterritorially, may appear to be an exercise of political power, traditional
conflicts analysis does not directly implicate the power of the states involved.
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concomitant focus on substantive similarity across systems, makes the

power of certain sovereigns more relevant.
As Saskia Sassen has noted, "some states are more sovereign than
others" in steering the development of global regulatory mechanisms.225
The perceived trend in the various international economic law
movements is toward a Western standard, 226 and U.S. regulators in
particular are often viewed as seeking to transfer U.S. regulatory models

to the global arena. 27 In the areas of securities and banking regulation,
for example, many commentators have suggested that the primary goal
of the United States in the harmonization process is the adoption of U.S.

regulatory standards worldwide.2 2 ' The use of expert legal assistance in
advising the drafters of economic legislation in emerging countries has
been criticized as a vehicle for the achievement of that end,2 9 as has the
use of networks of sub state-level agreements between regulators.230

The more frequent the resolution of economic conflict through
private or supranational solutions, then, the more likely that the policies
embodied in the laws of a relatively small number of relatively powerful

states will be implemented. The universe of situations in which
competing regulatory laws might be considered has shrunk, replaced by
225. Saskia Sassen, The State and Economic Globalization: Any Implications for
InternationalLaw?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 109, 116 (2000).
226. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

17 (1996) ("The new transnational regimes... are assuming a specific form, one wherein the
states of the highly developed countries play a strategic geopolitical role. The hegemony of
neoliberal concepts of economic relations.., has contributed to the formation of transnational
legal regimes that are centered in Western economic concepts.")
227. See David J. Gerber, The US.-European Conflict Over the Globalization of Antitrust
Law: A Legal Experience Perspective, 34 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 123, 133 (1999) (In the context of
antitrust analysis, suggesting that "[flor U.S. participants, points of convergence are easily
imagined: a world of competition law systems resembling the U.S. system").
228. See Cox, supra note 221, at 150 ("U.S. policy makers... envision [international
standardization] as a game in which the other nations of the world should raise the level of their
disclosure rules rather than the U.S. lowering its own disclosure requirements."); Licht, supra
note 33, at 275, noting that IOSCO harmonization has been in part "a leverage mechanism for
imposing uniform disclosure rules so that [advanced markets') hegemonic leadership would not
be eroded"; see also Eric Helleiner, Sovereignty, territorialityand the globalization offinance, in
STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 144 (David A. Smith et al. eds., 1999)
(describing the role of the United States in obtaining cooperation of other states during
negotiation of the Basle Accord).
229. See, e.g., Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 179 (1999).

230. See Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction Between Jurisdictions and
the Construction of Global Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 112 (William Bratton et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION] (discussing "the strategic
interplay among regulators, for example to expand the scope of their jurisdiction by creating a
forum they can influence...").
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the more frequent use of standardized solutions based on Western
models. Although the municipal laws of those countries may not be
applied directly, their values will be reflected in the product of the
harmonization and coordination process. Under the substantive
approach, in other words, the relative power of sovereign states may
play a large role in determining the outcome of regulatory conflict.231
Independent of the content of standardized solutions, this process may
be criticized on foreign relations grounds in that it replaces "neutral"
consideration of competing laws in the individual case with the
application of law reflecting non-neutral values. The danger in a
substantivist system is that because global regulatory standards reflect a
bias toward the approach of certain states, that bias will be reflected in
each instance of their application, regardless of whether the conduct
subject to regulation bore any connections with those states at all.
Recent rulemaking in the area of tender offer regulation may in this
regard provide a useful counter-example. In dialogue concerning the
procedural problems posed by cross-border tender offers, one proposed
solution was the development of global standards regulating disclosure
and dissemination of information to security holders.232 In any such
discussion, the approval of U.S. regulators-as supervisors of the
world's largest capital market-would play an important role. Some
commentators therefore anticipated a situation in which the United
States would simply insist on some version of required disclosure that
strongly resembled current U.S. rules, a solution that would have met
with criticism abroad. Instead, however, a solution was developed that
incorporated elements of territorial sovereignty-based jurisdiction. The
Securities and Exchange Commission put in place a sliding scale of
exemptive relief for tender offers for the securities of foreign private
issuers."' When less than ten percent of the subject securities are held
231. Even under a system of rules founded on sovereign equality, states may of course have
unequal power. Because business activity takes place in particular locations and its economic

impact is felt in particular markets, territorial linkages will necessarily lead more often to the
application of certain countries' laws. See Henkin, supra note 56, at 13 ("[Slingle states still have

jurisdiction over pieces of that global activity which can be localized in its territory or with which
it has links of nationality and of money-and some states have quite a lot of links of nationality
and money.") But in such a system, a decision as to regulatory authority is made for each
transaction on a power-neutral basis.
232. See, e.g., Edward F. Greene, Andrew Curran and David A. Christman, Toward a
Cohesive InternationalApproach to Cross-Border Takeover Regulation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV.

823, 872-73 (1997) (proposing the formulation by IOSCO of substantive "minimum standards"
for the conduct of cross-border tender offers).
233. See Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combinations and Rights
Offerings, Securities Act Release. No. 33,7759 (October 19, 1999) (64 FR 61382).
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by U.S. security holders, bidders need only file and provide to investors
234

an English version of the disclosure prepared under foreign law.
When more than ten percent but less than forty percent are held by U.S.

security holders, disclosure must be made according to U.S. rules, but

relief is available from a variety of procedural requirements.235 Only
when more than forty percent of the securities are held in the United
States would the full panoply of U.S. tender offer rules apply. 236 This
solution, in other words, looks to a proposed tender offer's links with

the United States as a relevant factor in determining the applicability of
U.S. standards. In situations where the linkage to the United States is
weak, it accepts foreign law on disclosure-whether or not that
regulation is similar in substance to U.S. regulation.2 ' The approach
thus declines to impose a U.S. vision of tender regulation across the
board. It has for that reason been viewed as more acceptable in other
jurisdictions than a U.S.-styled harmonized rule might have been. In
other regulatory areas as well, such attention to territorial linkages may
help avoid the often extreme criticism to which global solutions are
subject.238
VI.

CONCLUSION

A move away from the notions of territorial sovereignty
underpinning traditional private international law analysis has long been
considered an appropriate response to changes in the international
commercial climate. Because territory-based conflicts approaches parcel
out regulatory authority along geographical lines, it is evident that they
are in many respects ill-suited to resolve conflicts in a world of crossborder activity. That these notions of territorial sovereignty have to a
great extent already been replaced by other principles, however, has
234. Id. at II.A.2. The bidder must also ensure that U.S. security holders participate in the
offer on an equal footing with foreign security holders.
235. Id. at II.B. The Tier II exemption is primarily aimed at minimizing procedural conflicts
with foreign regulatory law that discourage foreign bidders from extending offers to U.S. holders.
236. Id.
237. See id. at I.A. One major criticism of the approach is that it did not go far enough in this
direction. By insisting that U.S. antifraud rules continued to apply to foreign tender offers, the
release may have made it difficult for foreign bids not to incorporate U.S. disclosure standards.
See id. at I.A., discussing the argument that "liability will remain a hurdle to including U.S.
security holders, particularly in view of the amount of litigation in the United States. .. "
238. For an example of such criticism, see Yves Dezalay, Between the State, Law, and the
Market: The Social and ProfessionalStakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory
Arena, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 60, supra note 232:
"In exporting or imposing a mode of economic governance which it can dominate all the better
for having been its inventor, the North American ruling class is giving itself the means of
extending its hegemony over the whole of the planet."
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been insufficiently examined. Through an analysis of two
interdependent systems-private international law and the regulatory
environment in which that law operates-this Article identified a move
to substantivism in the resolution of conflicts of economic laws. It then
went on to analyze this substantivism, concluding that it is in certain
respects problematic.
The new emphasis on substantive similarity of laws is reflected both
in changes to certain private international law rules themselves and in
the diminished scope of application of private international law
generally. I have suggested that this emphasis creates two significant
risks: the over-application of U.S. law in international contract cases,
and unfairness, stemming from power imbalances, in the resolution of
economic conflicts. For these reasons, the Article advocates reintegrating considerations of territorial sovereignty into private
international law analysis.
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